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Abstract  
With sport becoming a worldwide phenomenon through the international nature of matches 
and events, International Relations (IR) academic writers have had to take note. States and 
cities are increasingly using major sporting events and activities to re-image themselves, 
promote development and regeneration. Therefore, this research report will highlight 
numerous connections sport and IR possess through examining the widely proclaimed 
developmental impacts of hosting a mega sporting event (MSE) such as the FIFA World Cup. 
The professionalization and resultant commodification of sporting events seen through the 
transnational actor FIFA and World Cups in South Africa 2010 and Brazil 2014 will be used 
as case studies. These chosen cases will illustrate that in reality the FIFA World Cup is not as 
beneficial for host nations from the emerging or developing world as claimed.  The research 
will be theoretically based on the perspective of neoliberalism in relation to the IR concept of 
Globalization.  
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
1.1. Background and Aim 
Hosting a mega sporting event (MSE) promises not just the excitement of the event 
and media exposure for the host nation, but, also brings the expectation of a positive return on 
the considerable investment associated with hosting this type of event. This is especially true 
for one of the largest events, this being the FIFA (Fédération Internationale de Football 
Association) World Cup (WC). It has long been claimed by promoters that hosting MSEs will 
produce net economic and/or developmental benefits (Maennig, 2007). However, recent 
literature has illustrated this is not entirely the case. MSEs may also have unintended negative 
effects on the hosts which have not been as widely documented. This research report will 
explore the developmental impacts both positive and negative of such events. Unveiling 
whether in actuality the FIFA World Cups in South Africa 2010 and Brazil 2014 were indeed 
an honour to host or a hindrance to their development, economy, government and people.  
“Sport has the power to change the world…it has the power to inspire. It has the power to 
unite people in a way that little else does. It speaks to youth in a language they understand. 
Sport can create hope where once there was only despair. It is more powerful than 
government in breaking down racial barriers.”  -Nelson Mandela (Laureus, 2000). 
Sport plays an important part in the lives of millions of people across the globe. It 
possesses a far reaching scope with the capacity to transcend borders, religion, nationalities, 
race and unite class - whether the masses or elite. It manages to achieve this while generating 
incredible amounts of money in the process, for example in the boxing match dubbed “the 
fight of the century” between Floyd Mayweather and Manny Pacquiao. This was a highly 
lucrative and one of the most watched Pay Per View events in sporting history. It generated 
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an estimated half a billion dollars, with Mayweather earning $200 million dollars in one 
night, while spending less than an hour in the ring (Roan, 2015). 
The growing importance of sport has been witnessed through its means of promoting 
a region or state by hosting MSEs. For instance, South Africa’s international image was 
improved by hosting the 1995 Rugby World Cup and further through the 2010 FIFA World 
Cup (Riordan & Kruger, 1999:244). Hosting MSEs also helps emphasize a state’s economic 
ascendency as China somewhat flexed its acquired infrastructural muscle as a new world 
superpower by hosting the 2008 Beijing Olympics Games.  
Pursuing MSEs has become an increasingly popular political as well as 
developmental strategy for a wide range of urban, regional, and national governments (Horne 
and Manzenreiter, 2006:3). States compete vigorously for the right to host MSEs, especially 
the quadrennial Olympic Games and FIFA Football World Cup. This is understandable when 
one considers the scale of these sporting extravaganzas with in-person attendance in the 
millions as well as television audiences and money generated in the billions.  
Baade and Matheson (2002:344) validate the reasons as to why states wish to host 
these MSEs. The most convincing being the promise of a vast economic windfall forecasted 
by economic impact studies. As a result of these believed economic profits an increasing 
number of developing economies have joined the bidding frenzy, in hope of receiving a share 
of the spoils which would ideally aid in their development. However, it is also mentioned that 
host states must commit a significant investment into sports stadia and other infrastructure. 
Consequently, the question rises as to whether the developmental payback outweighs the vast 
economic, social and political costs incurred.  
Economic impact studies which Baade and Matheson (2002:344) have referred to, 
tend to neglect the overall developmental effects of MSEs which incorporate socio-economic 
and political implications. Therefore, this research will serve to illustrate not only the 
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economic impacts, but also the overarching political and social impacts of World Cups with 
the two most recent cases of South Africa 2010 and Brazil 2014. These cases are comparable 
emerging nations and as the thesis will illustrate, serve well in demonstrating that the great 
expectations of these hosts were not met with entirely favourable outcomes.  
 
1.2. Rationale 
International Relations (IR) as a field has not given much attention to sport. This is 
because both IR and sport are subjects viewed as distinctly separate. Sport has become 
international in nature. Therefore, it now provides a path to explore international affairs as 
occurrences, processes and structures in sport are comparable to events under the scope of IR. 
For instance, the developmental impacts of a World Cup can relate to IR as MSEs encompass 
multinational or non-governmental entities such as FIFA. FIFA, through its actions during a 
World Cup period affects sovereign states and governments, hence enabling this research 
report to examine an international actor or area of study that is often overlooked. 
This study seeks to systematically examine claims regarding the effects of WCs on 
developmental prospects of states. The assessment of documented evidence will make it 
possible to confirm, dispute, expand or detail these impacts. From this deductions will be 
made as to whether they result in long term, sustainable, positive effects or that nations may 
be better off by forgoing such events and focusing their energies on domestic challenges. 
Such challenges include being middle-income emerging nations located on the world’s 
poorest and least secure continents. Other more specific challenges are the residual socio-
economic legacy of the apartheid-era in South Africa for instance. This is compounded by 
stark inequalities, government corruption, widespread poverty, high unemployment, lack of 
housing that plague both South Africa and Brazil. 
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Many parallels can be drawn between BRICS nations South Africa and Brazil. This is 
true regarding their ambitions for their WC projects, the contexts in which the bids were 
made and the manner of how the events played out. The similarities continue as they are both 
located in the Southern hemisphere and are regarded as emerging nations. Although Brazil 
may be further down the development path than South Africa. These countries share a history 
of political turmoil and face associated legacies of colonialism and social division. Both bids 
were made in an environment shaped by economic and social challenges, which influenced 
their respective economic and social ambitions for each event. Both countries also sought to 
use the event to project a new or expanded image of being regional hegemons to the global 
community. This relates to the concept of soft power as states have begun to use MSEs to 
increase international status, which will be addressed further in this report (Gordon, 2014). 
As stated earlier, previous research on the topic of FIFA World Cup impacts focused 
solely on the economic effects. These studies also used case studies that were not as 
comparable. For instance, FIFA World Cups in Germany 2006 and South Africa 2010 (a 
developed and developing nation). This could be argued to complicate such an assessment, as 
the two countries are so different developmentally. Gordon (2014) states other articles chose 
to compare differing MSEs such as the FIFA World Cup and the Summer Olympics which 
are not as relatable either. Therefore, the gap in knowledge being the interconnection between 
IR and sport is explicitly addressed by investigating the all-encompassing developmental 
impacts of the same form of MSE on two more similar developing states. This is carried in 
hope to illustrate similar trends and patterns validating why South Africa and Brazil were 
chosen.  
For purposes of clarity this next paragraph will briefly describe, what the all-
encompassing developmental impacts entail, before the concept of development is unpacked 
in detail further in this report. Developmental impacts are viewed as being a multi-faceted 
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process that cannot effectively occur through a single sector. Development in this instance 
will be described as the process of improving the quality of all human life through the 
eradication of poverty, access to quality education, health care, employment opportunities, 
infrastructural improvements as well as the increase of economic growth (Todaro and Smith, 
2009:131). Therefore, it is referred to as all-encompassing in contrast to development viewed 
simply through economic growth alone. A more detailed discussion of development is to 
follow further in the paper. 
Vast sums of capital are being made by FIFA. With financial reserves in the billions, 
the institution maintains its status of being a non-profit organization (NPO). It resultantly 
avoids taxes that would usually be levied against such a profitable organization (Smith, 
2014). Therefore this report will investigate the influence of FIFA and its impacts from WCs, 
consequently being a tangible impediment to a host’s development.  
The aim of this research report is summed up appropriately by Levermore and Budd 
(2004:14) stating that sport does provide an access point, for it is an important part of the 
international system as it shapes while simultaneously influences it. This report’s line of 
argument will address the existence of a strong relationship between sport and IR. By 
examining the developmental impacts of World Cups, a more in depth understanding of the 
international community will be achieved. 
 
1.3. Literature Review  
Existing research on sport has examined MSEs economic impacts on specific regions. 
Comparative studies of sport and its political impacts have also been carried out. However, 
these have focused specifically on nation building, moulding identity and solidifying 
nationalism. One cannot dispute sport’s ability to construct a sense of national identity, 
belonging and unity (MacClancy, 1996:206).  
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 “International Relations: A Case for Investigation Cross–Disciplinary” Beacom 
(2000:3) acknowledges the growing understanding of sport in IR being enhanced through 
cross disciplinary comparative approaches similar to how this report will proceed. Beacom 
(2000:3) is also aware that writers in the discipline of IR concern themselves with crucial 
actors such as nations, regions, transnational or international groups and organisations. This 
is applicable to this report too as topics of power relations, the role of the state and the 
relationship between domestic governments or bodies in or outside of sport are influenced by 
international actors or institutions are investigated. The recognition of sport by politics arena 
and its function as a vehicle for political change is identified by Beacom (2000:4). However, 
he significantly highlights that this perspective then ignores the long-term, structural 
relationship that exists between sport and political agencies at the local, regional and most 
importantly international level. 
The emerging relationship between sport and IR is examined by Houlihan (1994) in 
“Sport and International Politics” that Beacom (2000) frequently references. Beacom (2000) 
and Houlihan (1994) establish sport as a vehicle for mediation, ideology, nation building, a 
gateway into the international arena and commercial gain. This creates an implicit link 
between developments in IR and sport. Houlihan (1994) seeks to develop an analytical 
framework by presenting IR theories as a means of considering the relationship between 
sports and the international community which is essentially where this report finds its 
foundation. 
Joseph Maguire (1994) in “Sport, Identity Politics, and Globalization: Diminishing 
Contrasts and Increasing Varieties” grasped the international nature of sport. This enabled 
him to relate sport to globalization which contributed to the understanding of the growing 
phenomenon, due to the impact it was beginning to have on global business enterprises and 
the increased connections between discreet national domains as a result of 
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internationalisation. Levermore and Budd (2004) in their text “Sport and International 
Relations: An Emerging Relationship” then focuses on the significance and influence sport 
plays within modern societies under the dominant IR perspective. This text can be viewed as 
an attempt to bring the study of sport even closer to the discipline of IR, indicating many 
points of interconnection with sectors such as tourism, migration and the influence on 
international actors on states coming to the fore. 
Levermore and Budd (2004) also illustrate the neglect devoted to sport from the 
academic discipline of IR. Levermore particularly counters this with the view that there are 
areas in which sport has some, if not a major, role to play where IR is silent. For example 
Levermore and Budd (2004) make note of realism’s difficulty in explaining the numerous 
cooperative channels between societies, especially those witnessed during MSEs. This then 
serves as the main reason this paper will utilize neoliberalism with the work of theorists 
Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye emphasizing mutual gains for those involved through 
cooperation.  
As mentioned earlier, a larger set of studies as well as a number of authors in relation 
to recent literature on sport and IR have focused on economic impacts, and broader 
evaluations of economic cost-benefit analysis of sport-led development (Baade and Dye, 
1990; Crompton, 1995; House of Commons, 1995; Law, 1994; Turco and Kelsey, 1992). 
Further studies observe the greater social impacts of such economic scrutiny (Hall, 1992; 
York, 1991). In addition, literature relating to the costs and benefits of stadium development 
has begun to be revealed, although the focus has particularly been in the United States (Baade 
and Dye, 1990:5). Moreover, the writings of various academics (Coates and Humphreys, 
1999; Noll and Zimbalist, 1997) have found no correlation between sports stadia construction 
and economic development. Yet many studies consider the construction of stadia a benefit as 
opposed to a cost (Horne, 2010:4). Although new construction may increase economic 
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activity, it is also necessary to consider the vast opportunity costs, as public expenditure on 
such projects would mean a reduction in other public services, greater government borrowing 
or higher levels of taxation. In the long term the underutilization or neglect as well as 
maintenance costs of these stadia is becoming a more prevalent issue (Baade, 1996; Horne, 
2010; Black and van der Westhuizen 2004). 
In addition to the social analysis of sport in urban areas, there is a mounting literature 
on urban sports tourism as well as city marketing from MSEs. This literature has a 
predominantly managerialist set of concerns specifically catered to the effects of the 
hotel/hospitality industry (Kotler, Haider, and Rein, 1993; Law, 1996; Smyth, 1994). In 
addition, countries are faced with other hidden costs that may not have been accounted for in 
impact studies. These may include the continual upkeep and maintenance costs of large stadia 
noted earlier (Baade, 1996; Horne, 2010; Black and van der Westhuizen 2004). Whitson and 
Horne (2006:75) have concluded that social goals from the 2002 World Cup in Japan ‘that 
might follow from high-quality public infrastructure for sport … are still far from being 
accomplished’. Other sectors, such as the hotel industry, are also likely to be hit by long-term 
costs (Hall, 1992; 1997). In order to accommodate the multitude of visitors during an event, 
hotels may have a construction boom to increase their inventories. However, when the event 
is over, demand for high-end accommodation will fall, leaving too-much surplus capacity and 
putting downward pressure on room-rates (Humphreys and Prokopowicz, 2007:11). 
Further research from other cases demonstrates that an event such as the World Cup 
can have long term political effects or ambitions on improving international cohesion and 
reconciliation. This has been illustrated through the 2002 FIFA WC jointly hosted by Japan 
and South Korea. This was noteworthy as it was the first time since World War II that Japan 
and South Korea had co-operated over an event. The gesture was intended to reconcile the 
two states colonial pasts after Japan’s occupation of Korea in 1910 and the resultant 35 years 
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of colonial rule (Jarvie, 2006:115). However, it remains yet to be seen if the joint hosting of 
this event served its intended purpose of improving relations between the two states and their 
people. Maennig and du Plessis (2007:578) also found that the 2006 World Cup had 
considerable intangible benefits for Germany including a change in image and nation 
building. The 2006 WC helped to alter previously negative perceptions of Germany to one 
that showed the country being hospitable and welcoming. It also assisted with nation building 
in relation to the division between East and West Germany, legitimizing patriotism 
previously viewed as too reminiscent of the Nazi era.  
The 2010 and 2014 FIFA World Cup have then provided an opportunity for South 
Africa and Brazil to project a contemporary, reinvigorated image to the interenational 
community. Celebrating their respective cultures and identity while concurrently enhancing 
their, economy activity, societal conditions, national pride and identity as will be addressed. 
 
1.4. Research Objective and Questions  
The objective of this study is to shed light on the developmental impacts of World 
Cups on South Africa and Brazil, determining whether these events were advantageous or 
disadvantageous to the hosts. 
Through this study the following questions will be addressed: 
1) What are the demands of hosting FIFA World Cups? 
2) What were the developmental impacts of the World Cups both positive and/or 
negative in South Africa 2010 and Brazil 2014? 
3) Are FIFA World Cups as developmentally beneficial as promoted to be for 
emerging countries? 
This research report hopes to provide a platform to analyse a fascinating yet relatively 
recent topic in the field of IR. Through my research and analysis into the topic, I intend to 
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highlight the various elements which serve to make the relationship between sport and IR a 
dynamic one. It is hoped that findings presented here will attract a deeper interest in the topic 
and a desire to better understand sport, its events and effects on not only people but also their 
surrounding host nations too. My ultimate aim with this paper is to contribute to a more 
comprehensive understanding and appreciation of the significant role sport plays in 
contemporary international society enabling a better insight into the nature of international 
system.  
This paper ideally will be applicable to a wide demographic audience. It may prove a 
helpful analytical tool for those in governance primarily as they will be able to examine the 
feasibility of MSEs. It could also be beneficial to transnational actors and multinational 
corporations (MNCs) as to the profits that could be made from MSEs.  
 
1.5. Research Limitations 
The main limitations of this study lie in the fact that the Brazil 2014 WC was 
relatively recent. Due to this, the long term effects of the event cannot be examined. Credible 
information and reports of this event may have yet to be published. As a result, many of the 
sources regarding Brazil 2014 are internet sources which lack comprehensive verification.  
However, this limitation may also serve as a great opportunity to investigate new 
empirical evidence through using such a recent case study. I do acknowledge that although 
the event was recent, there is currently enough information to commence satisfactory 
investigation of the Brazil 2014 case study. The language barrier may also be an area of 
concern in examining the case of Brazil as information and documents have been written in 
Portuguese. 
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1.6. Methodology  
This research applied a qualitative research approach. Qualitative research consists of 
the analysis of existing literature of a specific issue or topic in attempt to reveal certain 
trends, results or outcomes (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003:22). The findings of this research work 
towards specifically supporting or denying the hypotheses, hence they tend to be more 
descriptive, rather than predictive as is often the case in quantitative research (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1998:11). It is necessary that this literature is credible and has undergone various 
process of formulation. For instance sources like newspaper articles and documentaries 
undergo unique, but vigorous, process of scrutiny and formulation (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003:3). 
This is important for the reliability of the sources that offer greater understanding of the 
subject. Through engaging in literature of a particular topic rather than statistical data alone, 
more comprehensive insights are able to be deduced. Scholars, myself included, are at liberty 
through questioning, analysing, providing evidence and further interpreting it through 
qualitative research (Bryman, 1988:8). Qualitative research also includes methods such as in-
depth interviews, group discussions with individuals within the context observations (Ritchie 
& Lewis, 2003:3). However, this was not the case in this report as a comparative case study 
analysis was utilised. 
 
1.7. Case Study Approach  
A comparative case study analysis is the in-depth study of a case or cases. A ‘case’ 
being any context, programme, event, activity or individual etc., studied over a period of time 
using multiple sources of information in this instance (documented and audio-visual data). 
This is the preferred method of research chosen with similar reasoning to qualitative research 
in general based on the understanding that content analysis of existing literature provides for 
a more wholesome grasp of the topic. Comparative case study analysis was selected, as the 
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use of quantitative methods with quantifiable and statistical measurements or experimental 
design would not be adequate as using numerical data would not suffice in attempting to 
understand and explain happeningd in World Cups that will be addressed (Strauss & Corbin, 
1998:11).  
A single case could have been used too. However, this research has been more 
convincing and beneficial with a comparison between somewhat similar contexts. An 
analysis and synthesis of similarities, differences and patterns have been drawn and discussed 
from the two case studies concluding whether the desired interventions for accommodating 
WCs achieved favourable outcomes for these host nations. 
The choice of case studies as highlighted in the rationale was based on the similarities 
both South Africa and Brazil being members of BRICS, as well as hosting the FIFA WC in 
the past decade which will be discussed further in the following chapter. 
 
1.7.1 Data Sources  
The information used will be based on primary data from the FIFA archives and the 
South African Football Association (SAFA) and the Brazilian Football Confederation or 
Confederação Brasileira de Futebol (CBF) as well as the Ministries of Sport and Recreation 
South Africa, and Brazil. 
The secondary data sources were acquired from written books, journals and 
newspapers. Audio-visual material such as documentaries, interviews and video logs (Vlogs) 
were also used.  
 
1.8. Data Analysis  
This research aims to clarify that contrary to how the FIFA WC is promoted, the 
positive impacts on hosts are overestimated and the negative impacts are somewhat 
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disregarded. Neoliberalism and its proponents such as globalization and capitalism will be 
analyzed in depth as it is the underlying concept facilitating corporate or modern sport at 
present. The new international labour theory and world systems theory will assist in the 
analysis the further illustrating how emerging countries are exploited from World Cups 
similarly to what occurs in the global international political economic landscape.  
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Chapter Two 
Concepts and Theoretical Framework 
 
The discipline of IR engages itself in the associations between collectives such as 
nations, regions, international groups and organizations. Covering a wide range of issues, it is 
significant in the analysis of international actors and the power relations that exist. As IR is 
broad in nature, it automatically incorporates cross-border activities, which have been made 
possible through globalization. This section of the paper will unpack the various concepts, 
terms, theories and actors that are crucial in the context of this paper. This will be useful in 
providing insights into the characteristics and behaviour of various actors in the global 
community and will help in providing a basic understanding before the case studies are 
examined. 
 
2.1. Globalization  
The phenomenon of globalization has swept across the world over the past few 
decades, becoming integral in the functioning of the global community. Its impact on 
communities has been beyond the economic or financial spheres, shifting the way in which 
global communities interact in areas such as sport. As the world becomes increasingly 
integrated, more opportunities have emerged for countries to host and organize what today 
have become known as mega events.  
As Joshi (2009:2) illustrates, globalization refers to the increasing economic 
interdependence of national economies across the world. This occurs through a rapid increase 
in cross-border movement of goods, services, technology and capital leading to a global or 
single world marketplace. A second definition of globalization provided by Robertson 
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(1990:23) refers to the concept as the crystallization of the world into a single space. It 
implies the intensification of social relations at a global level, linking distant locations in a 
manner that local events can now transmit or occur across the world. The factor of time and 
time difference are not viewed as insurmountable obstacles anymore. This is encompassed 
under David Harvey’s concept of ‘time-space compression’ (Levermore and Budd, 2004:14). 
There are numerous dynamics to globalization. As seen through the economic 
dimension, centred on the rapid exchange of money around the world or the increasing trade, 
financial interaction and sharing of expertise. The international movement of people such as 
tourists, migrants, exiles and guest workers is further proof of the interconnectedness of the 
international community (Joshi, 2009:2). Technological advancements exemplify 
globalization, via the transfer of machinery and equipment between countries produced by 
MNCs and government agencies. The media sector is also affected, entailing the rapid flow 
of information produced and distributed by newspapers, magazines, radio, film, television, 
video, satellite, cable and the internet (Joshi, 2009:2). Finally, the ideological and cultural 
dimension which is the imparting of differing culture and traditions, to the sharing of values 
associated with state or counter state ideologies (Maguire, 2008:4).  
Globalization is relatable to the hyper globalist school of thought. This states that it is 
an process that decreases the overarching power of the sovereign-state, as a global force 
driven by multinational corporations (MNCs), international bodies and capitalism. These 
forces undermine the ability of governments to control their own economies as will be 
discussed in greater detail (Scholte, 2000:779).  
 
2.2. Neoliberalism 
“A theory is a picture, mentally formed, of a bounded realm or domain activity. A theory is a 
depiction of the organization of the domain and of the connections among its parts… In 
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reality everything is related to everything else, and one domain cannot be separated from 
others.” (Waltz, 1979:8). 
IR theory is the beginning of analysis. It is the establishment of conceptual structures 
and theories that aid in understanding as well as explaining events or phenomena in the 
world. The role of IR theory is essential in critiquing social systems and informing associated 
policies or practices (Dunne, Kurki & Smith, 2013:358). 
The theory that could be related to globalization is that of neoliberalism. 
Neoliberalism is regarded as the revival and subsequent redevelopment of liberalism (Dunne, 
Kurki and Smith, 2013:358). In the first instance, it is a theory of political economic practices 
suggesting human welfare is best advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms. 
Its institutional framework is characterized by strong private property rights, free market 
capitalism and free trade (Harvey, 2005:2). Under neoliberalism entities must cooperate with 
each other in an anarchic or somewhat disordered international system that generates fear and 
unpredictability (Claassen, 2011:183).  
Neoliberal theorists Keohane and Nye (2003:49) define cooperation through the term 
complex interdependence. This involves a relationship of mutual reliance in which actions 
and interests are intertwined between actors, contrary to singular self-interests that dominate 
the agenda under realism and neorealism (Levermore and Budd, 2004:8). These intertwining 
channels that connect societies are otherwise known as interstate, transgovernmental, and 
transnational relations. Theorists have expanded the range of what are considered significant 
IR actors allowing the inclusion of issue groups such as FIFA in this instance  
Economically, neoliberalism is characterised as having free market mentality, being 
somewhat individualistic or privatized with less interference by governments in commerce. 
The global community is then given the opportunity for economic development linked to 
capitalism. Capitalism in brief being the system of generalized commodity production where 
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wealth is owned by private entities and economic life is organized according to free 
enterprise largely free of state control (Thomas, 2005:318). 
Politically, neoliberalism has encouraged intergovernmental or multilateral 
collaboration through intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) such as the United Nations 
(UN). Such international institutions assist with plans of action and decision making through 
comprehensive doctrines, norms, rules and expectations, similar to how FIFA functions
1
 
(Claassen, 2011:183). This international cooperation can also be regarded a better way to 
survive and prosper in the anarchic international community by combining diplomatic 
resources through institutional arrangements. Conversely, cooperation with such global 
institutions can be a detriment to individual states and their national governments autonomy 
Thomas (2005:318), especially in times of hosting FIFA World Cups as will be discussed in 
this thesis.  
In addition, neoliberalism can also negatively influence social as well as political 
relations between international actors, contrary to the mutual benefits and cooperation stated 
above. Unequal power relations in the international system result in one actor’s gains clearly 
outweighing the others (Dunne, Kurki & Smith, 2013:358). A number of the unfavourable 
impacts of World Cups on hosts exemplify this as will be discussed in this report allowing for 
the incorporation of two supporting theories being the New International Labour theory and 
Emmanuel Wallerstein’s World Systems theory. The inclusion of these theories serves to 
illustrate that the cooperative behaviour of international actors under neoliberalism that does 
not necessarily have positive outcomes for all the parties’ involved. 
The new international labour theory illustrates the division between more 
economically developed countries (MEDCs) and less economically developed countries 
(LEDCs) (Graaff, 2003:42). The MEDCs also known as the core are the main beneficiaries of 
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 One must remember FIFA falls under the status of being a not for profit organization 
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capitalism and proposed cooperation under neoliberalism. The core has evolved to include 
MNCs or private companies too. These core entities began outsourcing to LEDCs known as 
the periphery (Graaff, 2003:42). This occurred due to the allure of cheap labour and highly 
profitable untapped markets in the periphery that the core could capitalize on. As a result, 
there has been a trend of the core exploiting the periphery (Castells, 2000:70). The world 
systems theory could also be appropriate as it mentions another entity known as the semi 
periphery. These are essentially neither MEDCs nor LEDCs but rather emerging countries 
that fall in between (Graaff, 2003:39). These are the countries not powerful or developed 
enough to be viewed as MEDCs and not so underdeveloped or weak that they are viewed as 
LEDCs which could be argued categorizes South Africa and Brazil more appropriately. 
However, the semi-periphery countries are still exploited by the core countries and 
institutions such as FIFA in the process also impeding in their development. 
The new international labour theory and world systems theory are then applicable 
illustrating how the sporting sector mirrors occurrences in the international community as a 
whole. This will be shown as the core actors being FIFA and its main benefactors to an extent 
exploit hosts South Africa and Brazil while hindering their development.  
In terms of development under neoliberalism, policies of capital accumulation 
through economic liberalization, lassiez-faire economics or capitalism are seen as the most 
favourable method in achieving growth (Thomas, 2005:318). Growth could be used 
interchangeably with economic growth, which is viewed as a component of development 
(Cohen, 2010:298). In the case of this report, the neoliberalist perspective to development 
will set the foundation of the concept but will then take a wider approach. Essentially, this 
means the importance of economic growth will be highlighted, but the inclusion and 
importance of other social factors such as poverty alleviation or access to basic needs and 
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services in maximizing people’s capabilities will also be emphasized in aiding development 
(Sen, 1999:62). The following section will greater explain this form of development. 
 
2.3. Development  
Development is a complex multi-faceted concept that cannot effectively be described 
through a single definition. For many years, developmental theorists apporoaches 
concentrated on economic growth as the main goal of development by observing i) Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), ii) Gross National Product (GNP) and iii) Purchasing Power Parity 
(Roux, 2011:17). Cohen (2010:298) states that this was the case as it was more beneficial and 
safe to be preoccupied with issues of economic power  
There is indeed great importance in economic growth. This enables the development 
of infrastructure, employment opportunities as well as finance made available to the 
government to provide public services (Cohen, 2010:298). As opposed to instances in LEDCs 
where there is minimal growth leading to the demolition of the local market and business due 
to financial constraints. Hence LEDCs would decline further, compounded by lack of labour 
opportunities or vast layoffs of employees and lower wages during economic downturn. Such 
unfavourable economic environments would also lead to cuts in government spending, 
resulting in a lack of resources injected into social services like education, medication or 
government health facilities (Makokha, 2001:23). Nevertheless, the basic measuring and 
focus on economic growth is methodical and indeed necessary.  
However, it does not “paint” the whole picture. It rather neglects to take into 
consideration the greater scheme of political and social factors that should encompass 
effective development. Therefore, the model of economic growth based development alone in 
the context of this report is essentially ineffective. This is so because it grants high ratings to 
states that possess positive GDP or GNP but that often contain huge inequalities, encouraging 
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people to believe that such states (for example, apartheid South Africa) had done a good job 
for itself (Alkire, 2010:4). Moreover, the economic growth approach fails to take account of 
features of quality of life or wealth distribution that are not well connected with economic 
advantage. By signifying that development was being achieved by nations that increased their 
GNP, it distracted attention from factors or aspects such as health, education and inequality. 
China is a good example of a state that focuses primarily on economic growth for 
development. Reflecting this is its foreign policy in the post-Mao period, wherein the state 
focused on sustaining an international environment that supports economic growth and 
stability (Taylor, 2009:4). However, there are challenges associated with China’s focus on 
economic growth, which are related to the environment, workforce and business corruption. 
For instance, Chinese companies regularly avoid environmental and labour regulations likely 
to hinder the profitability of any given initiative. This is done by graft or colluding with state 
officials who are simply interested in maintaining economic growth. Thus hazardous 
conditions for workers or people in general, and violations of environmental laws are the 
norm all in the name of profit and subsequently economic growth (Taylor, 2009:7).  
When development is described by economic growth alone, then the element of 
examination is apparent: the economy. This then neglects a crucial aspect of the economy 
being the people that participate in it. An application of a multi-sectoral approach to 
development is more appropriate as effective long term development is nourished by the 
fruits of human progress. This multi-sectoral approach, involving economic, social, and 
political change aims at improving the quality of people’s lives, their knowledge and skills, 
employment opportunities, wealth distribution, while reducing poverty as well as inequality 
(United Nations Development Programme, 1996:1). Hoffman (1990:159) also emphasizes 
placing individuals at the heart of development:  
28 
 
“The people should be at the centre of the development process... we must not speak on 
behalf of others who are able to speak in their own name …” 
The definition of development utilized in this paper is based on the work of Amartya 
Sen. Coincidently it also links to the slogan greatly associated with the 2010 World Cup 
being Ubuntu meaning “putting people first” (Cillier & Handy, 2011:56). Amartya Sens 
perception of development offers a more comprehensive analysis compared to the normative 
framework of economic growth mentioned earlier. Sen views development as the means to an 
end; that of overall well-being. His ideas provide a broader spectrum for what constitutes 
‘development’ and takes into account the large role played by individual agency as opposed 
to purely market forces and economic success (Sen, 1999:62).  
Sen’s approach is known as the capabilities approach stating that the ends of well-
being, justice and development should be conceptualised in terms of people’s capabilities and 
functionings (Sen, 1985:10). This essentially is effective opportunities to undertake the 
actions (capabilities) and activities that they want to engage in, and to be who they want to be 
(functionings) (Gasper, 2007:336).  
Through the expansion of human freedom, a more varied choice of necessities can be 
reached such as health, education, income, political freedom, and human rights. Limits on an 
individual’s capabilities can be the result of the state. Furthermore, a state that only focuses 
on economic growth and not the social aspects at play severely misses the desired goal of 
development in this context. Those who are marginalized or lack capabilities may be tempted 
to eat into reserves of nature and society to meet immediate needs resulting in higher crime 
(Gasper, 2007:336). Social inequity and lack of opportunity essentially hinders development 
as citizens are trapped in poverty with fewer chances to escape and contribute to the 
development of their community. This is why development cannot be reduced to a single 
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measure such as economic growth, but needs to be multidimensional, concerned with the 
nature of the lives that people live. 
An example of how Sen’s capabilities approach offers a better way to understand 
development will be now used. Using data from 1980-1982 Sen compared emerging 
countries, some of which happen to be BRICS members now. His findings were that while 
the (rough equivalent) GNP per capita of Brazil and Mexico were more than seven times that 
of India, China and Sri Lanka, performances in life expectancy, infant mortality and child 
death rates were best in Sri Lanka, and better in China compared to India, Mexico and Brazil 
(Robeyns, 2003:95). Thus Sen settled that the public policy of China and Sri Lanka towards 
allocating food, public health actions, medical facilities and education led to their more 
favourable social standings (Robeyns 2003:96). This shows that rankings of countries based 
on GNP per capita is distinctive from classification constructed on selected functioning’s and 
should not be equated with growth in quality of life. 
It is essential then to address how development will be viewed in the context of this 
report and how FIFA World Cups impact the differing aspects under development which are 
wider than just economic growth. South Africa and Brazil are both BRICS nations thus they 
could fall under the developing world or emerging world, meaning they have greater 
aspirations to their developmental goals and growth than LEDCs. There is no single “correct” 
way to develop. It cannot effectively occur through one MSE like a FIFA World Cup or a 
single segment whether economic growth, social equity or political participation 
independently. A combination of all these aspects would entail effective wholesome 
development in essence enhancing or hindering good change in the host nations. Hence the 
definition of development in this report will be: 
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“The process of improving the quality of all human lives through the eradication of extreme 
poverty, access to quality education, health care, employment opportunities, infrastructural 
improvements as well as the increase of economic growth” (Todaro and Smith, 2009:131). 
Some literature regarding development relates to perceived impacts MSEs have on 
hosts often are referred to by FIFA as the legacy of World Cups (Preuss, 2006:2). In general 
terms legacy is defined as property left by will (Harper, 2001 cited in Preuss, 2006:3). This 
however makes the assumption that remnants of the FIFA WCs firstly are all deliberate, 
belong to someone else (FIFA and the various stakeholders) and are only physical remains.  
Clearly a more expansive definitions of the term legacy as stated by Swart, Bob, Cornelissen, 
Nkhahle and Wood (2009:6) is needed: “all the intended and unplanned, positive and 
negative, tangible and intangible structures or societal relations that developed in the context 
of an event and persist for a significant period of time after the event has come to an end.” 
This definition of legacy can double as an exact characterization of developmental 
impacts outlined in this paper in light of the central conception of development. This 
approach to legacy like development covers a wider range of impacts including economic, 
social or political and is thus interchangeable if necessary.  
Having established the theories and concepts that will be applicable in this study, it is 
now time to turn the focus to the actors that will be crucial in the investigation, these being 
FIFA along with BRICS countries South Africa and Brazil. 
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Chapter Three 
Background Information and Contextualization 
 
3.1. FIFA 
The Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) is the principal 
governing body of world football. It was founded in 1904 by respective national football 
officials and their corresponding associations from France, Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Switzerland, Spain, Denmark, Sweden and Germany. The organization became crucial in 
integrating European football by allowing tournaments to take place, but also streamlining 
the interpretation of rules and laws of the game (FIFA Statutes, 2014:6). 
Based in Zurich (Switzerland) FIFA is described as an international non-
governmental organisation governed by Swiss law, with an influence in the sports world that 
reaches all corners of the earth. 
“Any association which is responsible for organising and supervising football in its country 
may become a member of FIFA. In this context, the expression 'country' shall refer to an 
independent state recognised by the international community.”— FIFA, (FIFA, 2008:8) 
It is interesting to note that FIFA has grown to exceed the number of members in the 
UN. It comprises 209 member associations or national football associations representing 
entities across the board such as sovereign states, dependent territories, sub-national entities 
and even semi-recognized sovereign states for instance Palestine and Chinese Taipei 
(Taiwan) (FIFA, 2015). 
FIFA’s duty is to preside over the world’s most popular sport, ensuring the 
organization, governing and smooth running of tournaments, the most important of which is 
the quadrennial FIFA World Cup (Pielke, 2013:257). FIFA strives for the constant 
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improvement of the game of football portraying it as the “global game” (FIFA Statutes, 
2014:6). Through this it aims to use football as a unifying force not only by improving the 
game but also through social as well as human development, encouraging peace, education, 
health and social integration (FIFA Statutes, 2014:6).   
FIFA’s statutes or governing documents meticulously specify rules and laws for the 
effective running of its 6 regional confederations. For more effective administration, regional 
bodies are prevalent in the sporting world, similar to bodies such as the European Union (EU) 
or African Union (AU). Football member associations are not only affiliated to FIFA but also 
to their respective continental governing bodies. These groups are responsible for staging 
international competitions for national teams in their respective jurisdictions while working 
closely with FIFA. Numerous regional groups are necessary in managing the world’s most 
popular sport that essentially has no off season. This is further complicated by domestic club, 
league or cup competitions within individual countries that often overlap with international 
tournaments or friendlies (FIFA, 2015).  
Structurally, FIFA comprises of a Congress which is the supreme legislative 
body comprising of all the member associations, with each getting one vote. Various articles 
in Congress direct which agendas are to be addressed within the organization. This is 
necessary with the sheer growth, development and ever changing nature of world football. 
The Congress is almost viewed as football’s parliament with the responsibility of developing 
the game (FIFA Statutes, 2014:8). 
Congress is followed by the Executive Committee which is the decision-making body 
of the organization chaired by the Congress elected FIFA President as well as the Emergency 
Committee which deals with matters requiring immediate settlement. This forum allows the 
six regional confederations to directly lobby or influence decisions, with the direction or 
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assistance of some 22 specialist standing committees. Its role includes determining the dates, 
locations and format of tournaments (FIFA Statutes, 2015:31).  
The President, such as newly appointed Gianni Infantino, holds the highest office at 
FIFA. Possessing unrivalled power and influence, he basically represents FIFA as well as 
presides over its respective bodies and those committees of which he has been appointed 
chairman (FIFA Statutes, 2014:10). He is also entitled to vote and casts the deciding vote 
when a ballot is tied, as well as appoints or dismisses the Secretary General. Decisions passed 
by the President, the Congress, the Executive and the standing committees are implemented 
by the FIFA administration headed by the Secretary General.
2
 With a similar role to that of 
Ban Ki-moon, the UN Security General, he is assisted in his work by more than 25 standing 
committees and by two judicial bodies the Disciplinary Committee, the Appeal Committee 
and the Ethics Committee (FIFA Statutes, 2014:14). 
In accordance with the Bidding and Hosting Agreement (collectively the Hosting 
Agreement), a separate legal entity known as the Local Organizing Committee (LOC) is set 
up by the respective host football association (FIFA Statutes, 2014:14). It accepts the 
obligation of being responsible for organising, hosting and staging the FIFA World Cup. 
More importantly, it handles the security for the duration of the World Cup under the 
direction of FIFA that often has the final say in decisions which are not subject to appeal. 
First and foremost, this means to ensure the event runs smoothly in terms of security and 
quality. Secondly, it ensures the needs or interests of FIFA and its affiliates are not impeded 
(Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2011:52). 
The FIFA World Cup is FIFA’s headline event. Embodied in the FIFA Statutes, this 
MSE takes place every four years. Roberts (2004) defines certain sports events as ‘mega’, the 
difference being they are ‘discontinuous’, out of the ordinary, international and simply big in 
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 Currently no Secretary General since Jerome Valcke was dismissed. 
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composition. The FIFA World Cup is definitely a mega sporting event, arguably the world’s 
biggest sporting event. What makes it a MSE is its ability to transmit itself as well as 
promotional messages to billions of people through various platforms such as television, 
radio and more recently streaming on the internet (Roberts, 2004). MSEs attract an 
increasingly more international audience and composition. As a result, media giants such as 
Fox Sports, SkyTv, Supersport and ESPN have endorsed sport, particularly the World Cup as 
a spectacle. Therefore, they capitalize fiscally on sharing or broadcasting to vast regional or 
global audiences (Levermore and Budd, 2004:37).  
As a general rule, every association or team affiliated to FIFA may participate in the 
WC, granted they passed through the preliminary qualifying competition. The host nation or 
Organising Association’s representative team automatically qualifies for the final competition 
(FIFA, 2015). The World Cup or World Cup Finals involves 32 teams battling it out for the 
title of World football champions. It proceeds through a tournament phase, characterised by 
group stages, followed by knockout stages (Quarter finals, Semi- finals, 3
rd
 and 4
th
 place 
playoff and the Final) over a period of a month. 
The World Cup was established in 1930 as a result of the growing prominence of 
football at the Olympics (Matheson, 2012:5). In the past, the event has been hosted 
predominantly by European and Latin American countries. However, in 1994 FIFA sought to 
expand the reach of the game by awarding the event to the USA (Matheson, 2012:5). This 
trend has continued with Japan and South Korea being awarded the event in 2002, as well as 
South Africa 2010, both firsts in those respective regions. FIFA will continue to reach new 
frontiers with Russia 2018 and Qatar 2022 being the next hosts who have never hosted the 
event before (FIFA, 2015). 
The growing prominence of international sports organizations like FIFA is argued to 
have reduced the influence of national governing bodies of sport. Reminiscent of the 
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influence IGOs such as the UN and MNCs have had on states, it is seen as reducing their 
autonomy. Essentially, this complicates the relationship between FIFA and its members or 
hosts almost mirroring a public-private divide. The public in this instance being the host, and 
the private being FIFA as well as its stakeholders (Scholte, 2000). The greater influence of 
private interests has affected the running of FIFA and challenged the political and 
institutional capacity of the hosts steering policy choices to affect the economy and society 
negatively as this report will show.  
FIFA maintains that it is a non-profit organization. However, the enormity of its funds 
proves otherwise with equity reserves being at USD $1.5 billion at the conclusion of the 2014 
financial year (Financial Report, 2014:9). The enormity of FIFA’s returns has led to frequent 
questioning by numerous scholars and journalists. This recurring discourse aids in the 
argument that hosts (especially emerging or developing ones) are exploited during the World 
Cup. This is further fuelled by corruption scandals that have plagued the organization for 
years, jeopardizing FIFA’s legitimacy, transparency and accountability. Such occurrences 
have been interpreted as FIFA being a global business and not an international sports 
organization.  
These accusations coincide with the growth of FIFA’s economic aspirations along 
with the professionalization and commercialization of sport in general. Drawing from the 
work of Maguire (1999) and Jarvie (2006) the evolution of sport crossing the threshold into 
the business realm in essence becoming a commercialized global phenomenon commenced in 
the 1950s (Maguire 1999:365). One could argue this as a component of the commodification 
of virtually all human activities. Consequently, sport would then act as a myriad of 
neoliberalism and globalization processes (Arnaud and Riordan, 1998:7). The rapid 
expansion of major international sports goods industry and the enthusiastic embracing of 
sport by the media exemplify sports commodification. The ever growing capitalist mentality 
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by international sporting organizations during MSEs is summed up aptly by George 
Gainsford manager of legendary American Boxer Sugar Ray Robinson stating: 
“We are only interested in money. With us it is strictly a question of finance, not glory or 
anything silly like that” (Westerbeek & Smith, 2003:1). 
Commidification resulted in commerce becoming the main goal. This refers to 
activities or procedures involved in buying and selling items incorporating the production of 
goods and services to earn profit (Westerbeek & Smith, 2003:90). Therefore, to 
“commercialize” would focus on the goal of making money. When applied to the context of 
this report, it would entail the production of events like the FIFA World Cup in search of 
profits.  
Large amounts of profits are indeed able to be made from numerous avenues. 
Avenues that FIFA monopolizing the sale of sporting merchandise, advertising, sponsorship 
deals and television broadcasting (Eisenberg, 2006:61). There is a lot at stake. With the 
world’s biggest brands such as Coca Cola and Adidas who have gone on to become FIFA’s 
key partners, others such as Emirates, Hyundai-Kia, Sony, VISA and Gazprom have a vested 
interest in the smooth running of a World Cup (Eisenberg, 2006:60). These parties reportedly 
pay some $25-50 million per year to FIFA, generating billions in the process of WCs (Smith, 
2014). 
Therefore, these stakeholders are a crucial source of income for FIFA and further 
supplement the sheer mass appeal of football. This is done in return for marketing rights 
during the global showpiece in which the World Cup remains one of the most attractive 
media entertainment properties through viewership and attendance (Eisenberg, 2006:60). 
Sponsors can feel confident that when the World Cup final is being broadcast about a quarter 
of the world’s adult population are tuning in, making it a huge commercial platform 
(Houlihan, 1994:356).  
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Having examined the central actor FIFA, the remainder of this chapter will be 
dedicated to introducing BRICS nations South Africa and Brazil 
 
3.2. BRICS 
The world comprises of various states, either developed, developing or 
underdeveloped. On the one end of the spectrum you witness MEDCs in the global North. 
These are characterised by higher Gross National Product (GNP) figures, manufacturing high 
valued goods, higher birth rates, lower death rates and longer life expectancy. At the other 
end you have LEDCs in the global South which are the inverse, accompanied by greater 
social inequalities and poverty. On this basis different countries have different developmental 
priorities based on their level of growth. 
In between MEDCs and LEDCs one would find countries considered emerging; 
essentially where BRICS countries would situate themselves. The acronym ‘BRIC’ (standing 
for Brazil, Russia, India, China) was coined in 2001 by Goldman Sachs economic consultant 
Jim O'Neill. This further grew to include South Africa in 2010 hence becoming BRICS 
(Horne 2010:2).  
To put it simply, BRICS countries are on the rise. BRICS refers to a group of 
developing or emerging countries becoming undeniably competitive in the international 
political economy (Figueiredo, 2013:2). BRICS countries (excluding South Africa) have 
begun to command crucial stations of international trade and investment flows in the global 
community with total Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows reaching USD$322 billion in 
2013 accounting for over one fifth or 22% of global FDI (The BRICS Post, 2014). China 
went as far as becoming the world’s second largest economy, challenging the global hegemon 
the USA and the international system as a whole (Figueiredo, 2013:2). These awakening 
giants as they are often referred to, have been able to create an alternative point in the global 
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balance of power attracting new modes of investment in attempt to further solidify the 
emerging powers in the world market. Through this they are forming new connections and 
forcing themselves into the centrality of power in the process.  
It must be noted that these countries face domestic challenges found in LEDCs. South 
Africa and Brazil are key examples, struggling with socioeconomic disparities, income 
polarization and poor quality of human life for a greater part of the population. These 
domestic issues are often further aggravated by hosting MSEs as will be shown due to the 
extensive strenuous demands. Although these states compared to MEDCs can be regarded as 
fiscally fragile and lacking the necessary resources, promoters or boosters of World Cups 
have led these countries to believe MSEs are an opportunity for greater development and 
integration into the international community (Maennig, 2007). 
The allure of MSEs continues to grow as BRICS countries continually competitively 
bid to host. This is exemplified through BRICS countries over the past 5 years hosting the 
world’s biggest sporting events with China hosting the Olympics in 2008, India staging the 
Commonwealth Games in 2010, South Africa with the 2010 FIFA World Cup, Russia taking 
a step further hosting the 2014 Winter Olympics and furthermore the 2018 FIFA World Cup, 
and Brazil undertaking the most prominent MSEs consecutively being the FIFA World Cup 
in 2014 and the Olympics in 2016. 
 
3.3. South Africa 
South Africa, the “Rainbow Nation” is the southernmost country in Africa. With a 
population of 54 million, it is regarded the regional hegemon of Africa, however it faces stiff 
competition from Nigeria which challenges that position (Statistics South Africa, 2015:1). 
South Africa has shown hegemonic traits on an economic basis compared to the rest 
of the continent. Its GDP was worth US$349.82 billion in 2014 making up 24% of Africa’s 
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share. This was second to Nigeria at US$568.51 billion (Trading Economics, 2015). Sub-
regionally South Africa accounts for 41% of the Southern African Development 
Community’s (SADC) total trade, producing nearly 55% of Southern Africa’s GDP (World 
Bank, 2014). 
South Africa has recognizable clout or influence on the continent even though it is 
second to Nigeria in GDP statistics. This is true as the global North sees it as the “gateway to 
Africa” (Schoeman, 2000:48). South Africa is considered useful in bridging the gap between 
North and South. Many major powers view it as a way to infiltrate the African market, and 
use invitations to platforms such as G-8 and G-20 summits to consolidate this (Landsberg, 
2005:12). Some could even argue this was the case through its inclusion in BRICS, 
resultantly championing issues on behalf of Africa which include debt and market access 
within the framework of the Doha agenda and development assistance (Souaré, 2010:2).  
In times of conflict, emerging middle powers like South Africa are expected to play 
intermediary too. This is exemplified by South Africa being a non-permanent member of the 
UN Security Council for two recent terms, 2007-08 and 2011-12, during which they brought 
many African issues to the fore (Souaré, 2010:4).   
The domination by South Africa is further indicated through the number of MNCs 
having bases established in the country. Suppliers of various services such as mining, 
banking, construction and telecommunications namely AngloGold Ltd, MTN Group Ltd. 
SAB Miller have regional offices. This is further seen by the major manufacturing plants seen 
by Volkswagen and BMW (South African Bid Company, 2003: Chapter 6). 
As mentioned under the section of BRICS, emerging countries such as South Africa 
still face domestic obstacles. Challenges such as being a democracy that is somewhat in 
infancy due to the country’s troubled history has left a deeply uneven society with significant 
developmental challenges. Confirmation of how unequal South Africa is can be illustrated 
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through its Gini coefficient measuring income inequality ranging from 0 to 1 (Bhorat, 2015). 
0 depicts a perfectly equal society and a value of 1 represents a perfectly unequal society. 
South Africa ranges from about 0.660 to 0.696, making it one of if not the most unequal 
society recorded (Bhorat, 2015). Unemployment figures make for further grim reading with 
the unemployment rate sitting at 24.3%, and youth unemployment at 49% in 2014 (Kumo, 
Omilola & Minsat, 2015:2). This is worsened by the rampant crime and just over half the 
population (27 million approximately) living under the poverty line (Grant, 2015). Such 
social issues are further compounded by economic shortcomings such as infrastructural gaps, 
notably inadequate energy supply leading to electricity shortages. This is worsened by 
negatively affected investor confidence or floundering investment levels as a result of weak 
domestic demand and the depreciation of the currency to record lows (Kumo, Omilola & 
Minsat, 2015:3). 
These issues have hindered South Africa from climbing to higher levels of 
development and have ensured it has remained marginal to its international counterparts. This 
is also true as many have argued that the importance of South Africa’s power is exaggerated.  
Scholars contest that South Africa is not truly a powerful state but because other African 
states are so weak South Africa is then regarded as powerful “by default”. This is more the 
case as South Africa’s strength becomes less relevant compared to its BRICS counterpart 
China, seen by its GDP being one-sixteenth of China’s output upon joining BRICS (Hervieu, 
2011). 
The people of South Africa have experienced many trials and tribulations over the 
past century, none more devastating than apartheid. Adapted from the Afrikaans word for 
“apartness”, this policy signified the division or segregation of South African people. 
Afrikaner nationalists believed South Africa was a divided society, that different ethnic 
groups could potentially be destructive towards one another and hence a form of “separate 
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development” was deemed necessary to minimize contact and hostility (Giliomee & 
Schlemmer, 1989:1). Apartheid has had long running negative social and systemic effects on 
the South African people. The oppression of the black majority through the impacts of 
Apartheid have further manifested into socio economic and political issues the country faces 
at present.  
Such failings within South Africa’s borders did have an impact in the sporting world. 
Sport was in the front lines, playing a revolutionary role for social change against the 
Apartheid regime. Non-racial sport boycotts and the subsequent isolation of South Africa 
aimed at challenging the status quo of the Apartheid regime’s history of racial discrimination 
(Jarvie & Reid in Riordan & Kruger, 1999). In 1964 South Africa was suspended from the 
Olympic Games. This spread to other sporting codes such as South African Rugby 
(Ramsamy, 2004:6). Boycotts and political pressure began to impact the Springboks (South 
Africa National Rugby team). From 1974 they were unable to play in Britain, Ireland, France 
or Australia. The Springboks only major tour abroad was to New Zealand in 1981, which was 
marred by controversy and mass demonstrations against the apartheid regime (Ramsamy, 
2004:6).  
South African football bodies were greatly affected by racial lines too. The “whites-
only” football association of South Africa known as (FASA) formed in 1892 represented the 
minority with other bodies such as the SA Indian Football Association (SAIFA), the SA 
Bantu Football Association (SABFA) and the SA Coloured Football Association (SACFA) 
being launched in 1903, 1933 and 1936 respectively (South Africa 2010 Bid Company, 2003: 
Chapter 2). Such division among racial lines led to FASA being delegitimized. In 1976 in the 
aftermath of the Soweto uprising, South Africa was formally expelled from FIFA. This was 
accompanied by a number of secondary boycotts of countries leading to virtual blanket 
isolation from world competition (South Africa 2010 Bid Company, 2003: Chapter 2). Such 
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action through sports boycotts were significant and applied greater pressure in challenging 
the apartheid regime. 
Yet sport in South Africa also played a role in terms of reconciliation and improving 
the state’s image post Apartheid. Nelson Mandela, released from prison and elected as 
President in 1994, used sport as a means in the process of reconciliation, nation building and 
unity during his tenure (Riordan & Kruger, 1999:243). This was assisted by the removal of 
sanctions by international entities such as the International Olympic Committee (IOC), 
welcoming South Africa back into the world of sport by competing in the 1992 Olympic 
Games (Riordan & Kruger, 1999:243). 
However, it was most importantly through the hosting of the 1995 Rugby World Cup 
that South Africa was able to firstly portray its more positive image to the world as a 
democratic state on the rise after a troubled past. Nelson Mandela unwaveringly supported 
the Springboks, a team associated with Apartheid rule. This was a great stride in encouraging 
people towards nationalism, regardless of race and previous differences (Riordan & Kruger, 
1999:244). The Springboks went on to win that World Cup, but more importantly was 
Mandela and Springbok Captain Francois Piennar together holding the William Web Ellis 
trophy after the Final This symbolized hope of a united South Africa with the help of sport. 
South Afric’s 2010 World Cup bid had similar dreams and aspirations as the 1995 
Rugby World Cup attached to it. It was meant to bring similar change and benefits to the 
global image of South Africa and also an attempt to improve the socio economic 
circumstances that have plagued the country and continent. 
The official slogan of the 2010 World Cup “Ke Nako” meaning “It is time” loosely 
related to the bid and hosting being Africa’s turn to show itself off to the world (Human 
Sciences Research Council, 2011:50). This was coupled with the discourse of African 
Renaissance purported by former President Thabo Mbeki, which was a call for a discourse 
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emphasizing African economic, social and political growth and responsibility in transforming 
the continent (Alden & Pere, 2004:290). The previous co-hosting of the 2003 ICC Cricket 
World Cup with Zimbabwe and Kenya also affirmed the drive towards an African 
Renaissance through sporting events although this event is on a smaller scale (Van der 
Merwe and Van der Westhuizen, 2007:29). 
South Africa was then under the view that hosting a World Cup would bring 
development and economic growth, coupled with the more achievable positive image benefits 
(South Africa 2010 Bid Company, 2003: Chapter 2). This painted the event as a massive 
opportunity, which, as the report will show, was not the case. 
 
3.4. Brazil 
The Federative Republic of Brazil has many similar characteristics to that of its 
BRICS counterpart South Africa. With a population of 202 million (Worldometers, 2015) it 
too is regarded the regional hegemon of South/Latin America. Brazil’s GDP stood at 
US$2346.12 billion in 2014 representing 3.78% of the world economy, almost six and a half 
times that of South Africa (Trading Economics, 2015). 
It too is a country with a troubled past. This came at the hands of the military 
dictatorship which came and went between 1964-1985 (The Economist, 2014). Military 
juntas were an occurrence that plagued numerous Latin American states in the late 20th 
Century, although Brazil’s experience did not have the same severity as compared to tens of 
thousands of lives lost in Argentina (Watts & Rocha, 2014). During this period there was still 
tangible economic growth which may have assisted in Brazil becoming the 7th largest 
economy in the world today (Index of Economic Freedom, 2015). Brazil also has an 
abundance of natural resources such as iron ore, vast rainforests and recently discovered 
offshore oil reserves. It has since become the 12
th
 largest oil producer and an increasingly 
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alluring trade partner to resource hungry nations such as China (Casanova and Kassum, 
2014:49).  
Natural resources to a degree have helped the country experience a decade of 
economic growth and social progress. From 2003-2013 over 26 million people were lifted out 
of poverty, which is about half of South Africa’s total population (World Bank, 2014). 
Unfortunately, the impact of the global recession has stifled continued growth as GDP slowed 
from 4.5% in 2006-10 to 2.1% over 2011-14 nearly stalling at 0.1% in 2014 (World Bank, 
2014). Meanwhile Brazil is ranked 95
th
 in the world in terms of GDP per capita
3
 (McKinsey 
& Company, 2014:1). Although many were raised out of poverty in the past decade, a 
sustainable and adequate lifestyle as the middle class is described as, has yet to be realized. 
Individual productivity growth would therefore aid in raising incomes, living standards, 
empowering people and social mobility (McKinsey & Company, 2014:1). Such measures 
have not taken a firm hold in the Brazilian economy, hence the reason it ranks so much lower 
in the GDP per capita scale (McKinsey & Company, 2014:1). 
Similar domestic challenges as seen in South Africa hinder further growth in Brazil, 
none more prevalent than the wide gap between the rich and poor. The wealthy minority 
owns much of the profitable and arable land, which is only compounded by the extremely 
harsh conditions in the cities of Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo where the country’s largest 
favelas or slums are found. It is stated that in a 2010 census about 6% of Brazil's population 
lived in these favelas or shanty-towns which adds up to about 11.25 million people (BBC, 
2014). 
The goal of trying to improve one’s circumstance in Brazil is made harder with the 
various barriers impeding social mobility. Brazil like South Africa is an unequal society with 
its Gini coefficient currently standing at 0.55 (Rishe, 2014). Unemployment is also on the rise 
                                                          
3
 GDP per capita- the total output divided by the population, establishing the average output of each person or 
how much they make 
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in the country. The Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE) reports it averaged 
8.36% from 2001 reaching an all-time high of 13.10% in August 2015 (Taborda, 2015). A 
rising inflation rate only heightens an already dire situation for many Brazilian people, 
escalating to 9.5% with most households still only experiencing only modest income growth 
(Zacks Equity Research, 2015). This along with taxes and tariffs as well as the Brazil 
currency (Real) fluctuating unfavourably has pushed consumer goods out of reach, but also 
reduced sales and exports on a grander economic scale (Zacks Equity Research, 2015). Such 
conditions are further compounded by Brazil being in its deepest recession since 1901 
(Pearson, 2016).  
While Brazil has faced various socio-economic and political challenges throughout its 
history, one positive trait remained: being its footballing prowess. Brazil is the world’s most 
successful footballing nation. Although it performed poorly at the 2014 FIFA World Cup it 
has the most World Cup titles at 5 and it is tied first in appearances in the Final. It has 
qualified for every single tournament and boasts numerous legends of the game such as Pele 
and Ronaldo to name a few (The Top Tens, 2014). The Brazilian people live and breathe 
football. It is viewed as a religion in the country and the brand of football they play with great 
passion and flare inspires millions across the world encompassing the phrase the beautiful 
game. 
As pressure was indeed building against the Brazilian government with hostile socio-
economic conditions and a government rocked by continuous corruption scandals, they 
turned to sport along through the world’s biggest MSEs in an attempt at increasing their 
attractiveness and sharing in the global community. This sentiment is echoed by former 
President of the Brazilian football Confederation Ricardo Teixeira stating that they would be 
prepared as well as have a “consistent influx of investments” as a result of hosting the World 
Cup (CNN, 2007). He also stated how the event would enable Brazil to develop modern 
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infrastructure, improve social conditions by believing that it would trigger social 
transformation as well as make the country more visible in the global arena (CNN, 2007). 
There was great hope, optimism and promise when Brazil was awarded the FIFA 
2014 World Cup. This was doubled when the country was awarded the honour of hosting the 
2016 Olympics too. Brazil would essentially be opening up its doors to the world on the 
sporting world’s biggest stages. As was believed in South Africa, hosting a World Cup is 
seen as a much needed boost and a trigger for key investment, with many anticipating it to 
push a country previously isolated by military rule, into a more deeply interconnected global 
economy.  
With the foundation of this report’s crucial actors being established, the next chapters 
will unpack the numerous developmental impacts of FIFA World Cups.  
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Chapter Four 
Economic Developmental Impacts 
 
In a FIFA mandated article “Benefits of bidding for and hosting FIFA’s other World 
Cup Events” staging any sort of FIFA tournament is stated to be beneficial in an all-
encompassing sense for the host whether economic, social or political (Bid Collateral 
Brochure, 2010:2). Such claims are made in relatively broad terms by this document. If one 
examines these proposed benefits by world cup promoters in greater depth there is a trend 
that arises in which each benefit has an opposite or inverse cost that is often neglected. 
Therefore, this next section of the report is crucial in revealing the overall impacts of 
World Cups both good and the underemphasized bad. For organizational purposes it will be 
divided with economic being separate from the political and social. Under each of these sub-
headings the anticipated benefits will be addressed along with the most prevalent set of 
related demands or government guarantees required by FIFA and its correspondents. This 
will be followed by how the states went about the challenge of hosting the event and meeting 
the comprehensive demands by FIFA.These demands are stated as necessary in ensuring the 
smooth running of World Cups, but also guaranting FIFA and its major stakeholder’s needs 
are met. FIFA have been unforthcoming as to what these demands entail. However, countries 
that have failed in bids to host have begun to speak out and reveal the requirements (Pollock, 
2010). 
The repercussions of hosting both positive and negative through relevant facts and 
figures from the hosts will be given. This data will prove whether in reality the implemented 
measures under the World Cup demandswere indeed beneficial and whether they met the 
hosts, their government and their people’s needs or not.  
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As supported by the evidence below, it seems that the effects of World Cups are 
dualistic in nature, meaning a proposed positive result seems to bear an inverse negative cost 
or effect (Frawley and Adair, 2014). It is also important to note that these impacts are fluid 
meaning they interlink and complement each other. Therefore, although the impacts are 
separated into different sections, economic, political and social  quite easily have 
ramifications outside of their given subheading. The results will illustrate how the impacts do 
not occur in isolated pockets as previous economic studies may lead one to think and are 
more free flowing or interrelated. 
In the aforementioned FIFA article supported by common discourses of governments 
and FIFA, World Cups have widely projected economic benefits (Porter, 1999). FIFA goes 
on to claim that there will be increased cooperation and goodwill between the various 
stakeholders (Bid Collateral Brochure, 2010:3). This could be a result of greater commercial 
activity and investment with new sponsors, media, broadcasters and MNCs. Other revenue 
opportunities could be mediums such as tourism, ticketing, private funding and subsidizing 
(Bid Collateral Brochure, 2010:3).  
This increase in capital is said to improve infrastructure or be a catalyst for new state 
of the art facilities and development (Bid Collateral Brochure, 2010:1). However, these are 
often related to the improvement of football and the betterment of the hosts is not necessarily 
the main priority. Nonetheless, improvement in a countries infrastructure would come in the 
form of newly constructed or renovated stadia but more importantly the supporting 
substructures such as roads, hotels, airports, information and technology centres (Bid 
Collateral Brochure, 2010:3). This will be shown by a more in-depth analysis as of what the 
economic developmental impacts meant with specific reference to tax exemption, 
infrastructural improvements, the stadia and the overall monetary cost of the MSEs. 
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4.1. Tax Exemption 
"Any host country requires a comprehensive tax exemption to be given to FIFA and further 
parties involved in the hosting and staging of an event," 
       FIFA spokesman (Pollock, 2010). 
The most stringent condition by FIFA viewed as non-negotiable is that of tax 
exemption.  FIFA requires the entire event be free of tax for itself as well as any of its 
commercial affiliates or subsidiaries such as the organizing committee, the broadcasters, 
sponsors and service providers (Leijten, 2010).  
In conjunction with the tax exemption is that of custom duties and levies. This relates 
to how both South African and Brazilian governments pledge no duties, taxes and costs on 
imports, exports of goods and all foreign currencies to and from South Africa and Brazil 
during the World Cup period (South Africa 2010 Bid Company, 2003:Chapter 4.3).  
What this entails is millions of dollars that hosts sought to garner from taxing 
commerce, trade and spending by FIFA and its affiliates all lost to FIFA’s benefit. This tax 
exemption basically encapsulates all takings from the event, whether profits, income, 
expenses, costs, investments and payments (Pollock, 2010). These could be through differing 
channels whether cash or otherwise, including (i) the delivery of goods or services, (ii) 
accounting credits, (iii) other deliveries, (iv) applications, or (v) remittances, made by or to 
the exempt parties (Pollock, 2010). 
It is interesting to note how the tax exemption was so comprehensive within these two 
case studies. It could be argued that these countries along with LEDCs would understand and 
appreciate the value of tax in boosting their economies. In South Africa, the intensity with 
which this demand has been implemented was set in stone by The Government Guarantees 
that South Africa and its tax authorities implemented through law. The Revenue Laws 
Amendment Act (Act 20 of 2006) stated that any governmental authority with jurisdiction 
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over the assessment, determination collection or imposition of any taxes, duties or other 
levies shall not impose any kind of taxes duties or levies on FIFA, FIFA’s subsidiaries, the 
FIFA delegation and the Host Broadcaster (The South African Institute of Chartered 
Accountants, 2007). Meanwhile the Brazilian government, once awarded the 2014 World 
Cup, agreed that FIFA and its partners were to be tax exempt on any goods and services 
related to the tournament for five years; from January 2011 until the end of 2015 (Pollock, 
2010).  
The tax exemption law is somewhat ironic in the context of the World Cup. It is 
taxpayer’s money that are used to build the necessary infrastructure and stadia in hosting the 
event, while the major profits that lured hosts into bidding are untaxed, ending up in FIFA 
and its partner’s pockets. The demand of tax exemption is costly. It is so costly it lost South 
Africa a share of the US$3.5 billion in profits made in 2010 which could have gone a long 
way in improving the countries socio economic status (Leijten, 2010). Isabel Ortigosa of 
InspirAction, an NGO that focuses on international development across the world, stated that 
by conservative estimates Brazil stands to lose US$209 million through tax exemption with 
other estimates stating this could rise to US$450 million (Tax Justice Network, 2014). 
FIFA on the other had counters the assertions of tax exemption in their 
document“FAQ: Setting the record straight” in which they claim that  
“FIFA does not make any demands for a general tax exemption for sponsors and suppliers, or 
for any commercial activities in the host country. Instead, FIFA only requires an easing of 
customs procedures for some materials that need to be imported for the organization of the 
World Cup and that are not on sale in the host country.” 
         (FIFA, 2014:1). 
This, then begs the question as to why South Africa as seen in their bid book and 
legislation passed would amend laws and implement any exemption forgoing the necessary 
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finance from the event if there was no coercion to do so? This is somewhat harder to prove in 
the case of Brazil as its bid book is yet to see the light of day (Roper & Tomlinson, 2015). 
The influence and power of FIFA, coupled possibly with the sheer desperation to host by 
prospective nations, could leave them no other choice but to agree to these conditions 
regardless of how unfavourable were.  
The implementation of tax exemption greatly challenges the highly touted economic 
benefit that World Cups result in tangible income from taxation triggering greater commerce 
and finance (Porter, 1999). In actuality as shown, a large amount of the money is relinquished 
casting great doubt that the World Cups in South Africa and Brazil were profitable for the 
host and their people.  
This could be further reasoning to why a spokesperson from the South African 
Revenue Services was quoted as saying: 
“Our approach to the World Cup has been that it was never going to be a revenue-raising 
exercise. The concessions we had to give to FIFA are simply too demanding and 
overwhelming for us to have material monetary benefits” (Lackay, 2010). 
As this report has examined one of if not the most significant economic impacts of the 
World Cup through the tax exemption, it will now proceed to investigate the repercussions of 
the infrastructural developments that took place. 
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4.2. Tourism 
Further related to the tax exemption is tourism. Although tourism will not be analysed 
in depth in this report, it is important to note that it too is affected by the tax exemption. 
Tourism has a variety of economic impacts on hosts during a World Cup, especially by its 
boost on sales, profits, jobs, tax revenues, and income (Stynes, 2010). Such increases are one 
of the major selling points by promoters when pitching the benefits of hosting. However, the 
tourism sector is not exempt from the influence of FIFA’s government guarantees. It too is 
impacted by demands as governments enact laws to ensure that hotel prices for the exempt 
actors are frozen as on the 1 January the year of the coinciding World Cup event as was the 
case in South Africa (South Africa 2010 Bid Company, 2003: Chapter 4.12). This is 
supplemented by the hotel fees being 20% less than the rate at the time of 1 January for 
FIFA. A corresponding increase of hotel fees for unaffiliated fans or visitors that reached 
25% was seen in Brazil (Andrés, 2014). 
Furthermore, World Cups provide a short term boost to tourism and retail sales but do 
not have a lasting effect as often the jobs and revenue created during the event are offset by a 
significant drop in business after it (Sinclair, 1998:2). Therefore, FIFA World Cups do not 
necessarily improve sustainable profit or long term positive growth in terms of hotel 
occupancy and retail spending. One also needs to bear in mind who sells goods to these 
tourists. The World Cup sponsors that are tax exempt monopolize the markets for the 
duration of the event such as Adidas, Hyundai, Sony and McDonalds. Therefore, in some 
cases profits are expatriated to these companies’ foreign bases and local business is hindered 
essentially degenerating host nations into vehicles for sponsored private capitalist 
accumulation (Bond & Cottle, 2010). 
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4.3. Infrastructure 
Improvement to one’s infrastructure is necessary for the facilitation of a MSE and 
beneficial especially for an emerging or developing country. There are strict infrastructural 
requirements by FIFA for a host nation as will be discussed below. There are also rules that 
hosts need to abide by, some of which stifle development. For instance they state that there 
must be absolutely no construction works in host cities during the World Cup, essentially 
bringing all development through such channels to a screeching halt (Maening & 
Schwarthoff, 2008:9). This is just glimpse of the influence FIFA has in a host nation during 
the event. 
 
4.3.1. Stadia 
In terms of the stadia requirements in the bid to host a FIFA WC, prospective nations 
need at least 8 world-class stadia (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2011:50). The choice to use a 
total of 8, 10 or even 12 stadia is at the host nation’s discretion with South Africa using 10 
and Brazil 12 (BBC Sport, 2009). The onus of construction as well as funding these stadia is 
on the host government in terms of financing the infrastructure needed for these events and 
public funds being the primary source of capital (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2011:50). 
The smallest stadium needs to have at least 40000 seating capacity for the group 
games, 60000 is required for the stadia hosting the semi-finals and 80000 for the opening 
game and final (BBC Sport, 2009). The contracted stadia are also signed over in their entirety 
with 100% advertising rights to FIFA during the event. This is known as the FIFA Exclusive 
use period falling 15 business days before the first game at stadium and five business days 
after the last game at the stadium (Edmondson and Carter-Brown, 2010).  
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4.3.2. Exclusion zones and Ambush Marketing 
The FIFA exclusive use period, like the tax exemption, casts doubt on positive returns 
from the stadia investment. This is even more the case as their immediate surroundings are 
made complimentary towards FIFA. Inside and around stadia are made “fortresses” through 
what is called exclusion zones. These exclusion zones were created to fight against “Ambush 
Marketing” (Louw, 2012:92). Ambush or ‘parasitic’ marketing was first coined at the 2010 
FIFA WC referring to unauthorized or unlicensed business conduct by unaffiliated parties at 
FIFA events or fan parks (Louw, 2012:92).  
Ambush marketing is defined by Johnson (2008:24), as ‘a planned campaign by an 
organization to associate itself indirectly with an event in order to gain at least some of the 
recognition and benefits that are associated with being an official sponsor’. The word 
‘ambush’ has been used to illustrate the kind of the nature of such activities standing in 
competition with FIFA and its official sponsors or suppliers for maximum commercial impact 
(Louw, 2012:95). 
Exclusion zones as a result crush the sale of unaffiliated souvenirs, unsponsored 
snacks and drinks being sold inside the stadia or within a 2-kilometer radius of stadia and at 
fan parks (Leijten, 2010). This essentially guarantees maximization of commerce and 
advertising for FIFA and its sponsors as only they are allowed to engage in any kind of 
business. There is no trade accruing to the host government from local trading even though 
the platform was provided by the state. 
Both South Africa and Brazil spent incredible amounts on stadium construction with 
very little in return. It has been recorded that South Africa spent US$ 1,54 billion on stadia 
for 2010 accumulating to about 35% of total World Cup expenditure (Konrad Adenauer 
Stiftung, 2011:50). More recent results of the 2014 World Cup state that Brazil doubled that 
spending to US$3.6 billion on its stadium construction and renovations (Statista, 2016). 
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These figures alone are staggering. However, what makes them more concerning is that the 
majority capital is public expenditure, even though in Brazil former President Luiz Inacio 
Lula da Silva misled his people promising that all stadia would be privately financed 
(Valente. Jr, 2014:6). The only other entity to benefit from such uneconomical spending 
besides FIFA was the construction companies tasked with building these structures. 
 
4.3.3. Construction Companies and Corruption 
Construction companies were great beneficiaries from the two World Cups. From 
stadia expenditure, improvements in airports, hotels, roads and rails they profited over a 
prolonged period commencing at the announcement of hosting to the World Cup finals. In 
both of the cases there were instances of colluding, bid rigging and overpricing by 
companies. This ensured monopolization by a select few firms and huge financial gains in 
building for the respective MSEs at the expense of construction workers, host governments 
and taxpayers (Benjamin & de Wet, 2013). 
In South Africa, there were five prevalent construction companies being Aveng, 
Murray & Roberts, Group Five, Wilson Bayly Holmes–Ovcon (WBHO) and Basil Read. 
These were the major providers in building stadia for South Africa 2010 and related 
substructures (Bond & Cottle, 2011). These firms were accompanied by international 
construction firms such as German companies HBM Stadien-und Sportstättenbau GmbH, 
specialist stadium construction company, GMP Architekten and Hightex engineers, Italian 
company Cimolai, French company Bouygues, and Dutch company BAM International 
(Benjamin & de Wet, 2013). 
The firms benefitted substantially from 2010 World Cup preparations related 
infrastructural projects. For instance, Murray & Roberts, South Africa’s largest construction 
company had their hands in numerous projects. Such as a 45% stake in a cooperative public-
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private-partnership deal with Bombela Concession Company, which was responsible for the 
US$ 1,4 billion Gautrain project and all civil works related to it (Alegi, 2007:322). A Murray 
& Roberts subsidiary Concor along with Wilson Bayly Holmes Ovcon (WBHO) owned a 
US$ 43 million contract in the construction of the Peter Mokaba Stadium (Leads 2 Business, 
2015). Such companies were the more favoured choice by the South African government 
further acquiring more tenders as they played into the Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) 
discourse, lessfor transformative purposes but more by acquiring greater business 
opportunities (Alegi, 2007:322) 
However, what is often omitted in South Africa and Brazilian government reports of 
the 2010 World Cup is that of the collusion allegations and charges these companies incurred. 
Accusations of collusion were widespread in the build up to South Africa 2010 World Cup. 
The aforementioned South African constructions companies from 2007 were under inquiry 
by the Competition Commission South Africa for suspicion of collusion and monopolistic 
practices (OECD, 2008). A total of 15 construction companies in 2013 then agreed to pay 
fines totalling US$88 million for collusive tendering, after reaching a settlement agreement 
with the Commission (SA Commercial Prop News, 2013). These companies were charged on 
the basis that they colluded over mega projects relating to the 2010 FIFA World Cup with 
instances of allocating tenders amongst themselves, overcharging and striking deals of profit 
margins (AFP, 2014). What the Commission did not do is investigate the international 
construction companies that collaborated with the local firms which were also responsible for 
the artificial overpricing in the stadium construction (Benjamin & de Wet, 2013).  
Such malpractice comes at the expense of the South African public. It is the public 
sector through taxpayer’s money that incurs higher costs. This further adds to the argument 
that economically, the challenge of hosting a FIFA World Cup is not a finance generating 
project the hosts.  
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Similar instances of monopolization, collusion and corruption were witnessed in 
Brazil. Cottle, Capela, and Meirinho (2013:6) document how Brazilian construction 
companies Andrade Gutierrez and Odebrecht in Brazil similar to Murray & Roberts and 
WBHO of South Africa. These two companies were accountable for seven of the 12 World 
Cup stadia for the 2014 event. Andrade Gutierrez was involved in the construction of the 
National Stadium, Mane Garrincha (Brasília), Arena Amazon (Manaus), Beira-Rio Stadium 
(Porto Alegre) and the Maracanã Stadium (Rio de Janeiro). Odebrecht was also involved in 
the construction of the Maracanã Stadium (Rio de Janeiro), Fonte Nova Stadium (Salvador) 
and the Pernambuco Arena (Recife) and the Itaquerão Stadium (São Paulo) (Cottle, Capela, 
and Meirinho, 2013:6). 
In the case of Brazil opportunity for misconduct by firms was somewhat more 
straightforward. This was a result of construction falling behind schedule with 41% of the 
projects not being started by May 2012 (Cottle, Capela, and Meirinho, 2013:2). The reason 
these ventures were so behind was due to discontent at the socio-economic conditions in 
Brazil. Widespread protests took place expressing outrage over rising unemployment, 
transport costs, poor service delivery, quality of health and education provision, as well as 
soaring costs from World Cup preparations (Taborda, 2015). 
To try make up for lost time the Brazilian government in an attempt to increase the 
speed of approval of World Cup projects changed protocol for them to be regarded under an 
“exceptionality status” (Cottle, Capela, and Meirinho, 2013:5). The fast paced processing of 
World Cup projects as well as vast sums of money being injected to get them completed 
allowed greater room for misconduct. Companies colluded amongst themselves over 
estimating costs in the process while the influence of international construction firms such as 
the German architectural firm GMP also increased costs (Brazilian Ministry of Sport, 2010).  
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Once again construction companies profited greatly while billions of dollars of 
taxpayers’ money was spent on white-elephant stadia giving little in return. The public funds 
used on construction could have been directly implemented to improve the lives of citizens 
through housing, hospitals, schools, water and sanitation services that are almost luxuries for 
the poorest of poor in the South African shanty towns and Brazilian favelas. 
 
4.3.4. White Elephants 
Once the champions have been crowned and the “fever” or excitement of the event 
fades the hosts are left with tangible remains. Yet the architectural legacies from stadia are 
negative in nature, hence the name ‘white elephants’. Sustainability of stadia has been a 
major issue for South Africa and Brazil. The multi-purpose sport and event venues that 
promoters claimed these stadia would be are now underutilized and continue to be a financial 
burden since construction. The responsibility of upkeep and maintenance costs is left to the 
government and general public at the heavy price of social expenditure (Siegfried and 
Zimbalist, 2000:103).  
These incredibly expensive stadia little for the developmental agenda of both South 
Africa and Brazil as will be shown. The believed legacy stated by FIFA of improved overall 
infrastructure for a host nation through these football facilities has yet to be a convincing 
justification of the huge sum of public expenditure (Bid Collateral Brochure, 2010:2). The 
stadia or so called symbols of technological prowess and advanced modernity, did not help in 
closing the wide gap of socio-economic disparities for these countries poorest. Whitson and 
Macintosh (1993:230) reiterate this by stating that elite sport development “should not be 
portrayed, as it often is, as something likely to benefit the average citizen”. 
FIFA’s demands and the manner in which construction companies went about their 
business shows the lengths entities go to achieve profits. Siegfried and Zimbalist (2000:103) 
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corroborate this by observing through independent research that the economic impact of 
stadiums has uniformly found no statistical or significant positive correlation between sports 
facility construction and economic development. 
This next section of the economic developmental impacts will unpack specific 
instances of conspicuous spending in building white elephant stadia. For instance, in South 
Africa the building of Durban’s Moses Mabhida Stadium and the Cape Town based Green 
Point Stadium were built when both cities already possessed world class stadia that would 
simply have needed renovations to be World Cup worthy. The Durban and Cape Town 
municipalities however decided to build two brand new stadia instead. The cities of Durban 
and Cape Town went for more aesthetically pleasing venues adding to the spectacle of the 
event and catering more to FIFA and its broadcasting partners wants and needs rather than 
the cities own (Brümmer, 2010). As a result Growthpoint Kings Park Stadium (Durban), 
DHL Newlands (Cape Town) and Athlone Stadium (Cape Town) were overlooked for the 
Moses Mabhida Stadium and Green Point Stadium respectively.  
The Moses Mabhida stadium cost US$203 million (Tolsi, 2011). It is literally across 
the road from Kings Park stadium home to the Sharks Rugby Franchise. It seems quite 
irresponsible having two world class stadiums next to each other (Tolsi, 2011). However, the 
justification for the construction of the new stadium is that it would aid in Durban’s bid to 
host further MSEs in future such as the Commonwealth games in 2022. There is also a valid 
argument that the city’s municipality could have saved a large sum of money by upgrading 
the Kings Park stadium which could hypothetically been one of the more sustainable stadia 
(if it had been chosen) as the Sharks do pull in around 20000 spectators for their home rugby 
games (Sport 24, 2013).  
Green Point stadium cost US$ 600 million (Alegi, 2007:320). Situated in-between 
major tourist attractions, Signal Hill, Lion’s Head, and Table Mountain on one side, and 
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Robben Island and Table Bay on the other, it is a broadcasting director’s dream. These 
landmarks provide picturesque views to billions, improving the image of the event and South 
Africa by showcasing only the best locations. Therefore, it was seen as the more favourable 
option as it ensured Cape Town hosted a semi-final (Brümmer, 2010). The use of Athlone 
stadium may have had a more genuine developmental impact for the surrounding community 
and its substructure, unfortunately FIFA choose a location that was more pleasing to the eye 
and did not demonstrate the realities of South Africa’s poorest living in the Cape Flats 
(Brümmer, 2010). 
Other sporting codes in South Africa have raised concerns about the sustainability of 
the stadia in the aftermath of the World Cup as many of the venues are not able to cater to 
their requirements and are also simply too expensive to hire (Sapa, 2010). There were 
numerous complaints by sports authorities such as South Africa’s Premier Soccer League's 
(PSL) chief executive at the time, Kjetil Siem. He stated that the FNB stadium (formerly 
Soccer city) was ‘just too big’ to host teams like Pirates and Santos (Sapa, 2010). It would 
cost too much to use or make income from as it only achieves capacity during derbies 
between Kaizer Chiefs and Orlando Pirates (Sapa, 2010).  
The more financially affluent sporting codes the South African Rugby Union and 
Cricket South Africa state neither of them was consulted before construction began on the 
further sustainability of the Moses Mabhida Stadium and Green Point Stadium becoming new 
homes of local sports teams (Sapa, 2010). As a result, the specifications for the stadia do not 
accommodate for other prized investors. For instance, a lack of suites fails to cater to suite 
holders from to rugby teams the Sharks or Western Province. In terms of cricket, the fields 
are too small to accommodate games, losing another sustainable source of revenue.  
Hence these stadia only seem to be useful when world most famous musicians are in 
the country who are able to afford the venues and sell them out to capacity (ENCA, 2014). 
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Moses Mabida, Greenpoint and other unmentioned stadia will continue to be a major issue 
for the government and local municipalities as they continue to operate at a loss. For example 
Moses Mabida Stadium made a US$ 2 million loss in 2013 and Green Point Stadium 
continuously makes a loss of US$ 2.4 million each year (Steyn, 2015). Losses of this nature 
are only amplified in the more remote cities such as Polokwane and Nelspruit where the Peter 
Mokaba Stadium and the Mbombela Stadiums preside (Cottle, 2010:8). These stadia do not 
have any popular football or rugby teams close by and are not based in big cities which are 
able to attract large numbers for events (Cottle, 2010:8).  
If one is to examine Brazil in turn, the figures do not get any better. The Brazilian 
government decided to use 12 stadia in attempt to bring the World Cup to the most remote 
parts of Brazil (Manfred, 2015). This was a bad decision similar to that of the South African 
government building brand new stadiums in cities that already had their own. This was 
mainly because stadiums were built where they simply were not necessary, even for a 
‘football mad’ nation like Brazil. Nine out of the 12 stadia facing financial trouble now 
support these claims. (Deutsche Welle, 2016). There has been little or no return on any of 
developmental benefits stadia were claimed to bring. Once again diverting billions of dollars 
that could have been used to actually help the Brazilian people 
The most expensive stadium from the World Cup 2014 was Estádio Nacional Mané 
Garrincha in Brasilia which cost US$ 550 million to build (Garcia-Navaro, 2015). It has been 
running at a loss since the end of the World Cup. Without a professional football team within 
the city it is going to be near impossible to meet its US$ 2.1 million a year sustainability costs 
(Deutsche Welle, 2016). It currently serves as a parking lot for municipal buses and offices 
for the local government (Waldron, 2014). 
The Arena Corinthians in Sao Paulo home to local team Corinthians was completed 
10 months after the World Cup had come and gone (Manfred, 2015). Attendance at this 
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stadium is steadily on the rise, however, earnings from ticket sales are still being used by the 
club to pay of the price of buildling the stadium (Manfred, 2015). The Arena Pantanal in 
Cuiabá which cost US$ 215 million has become home to the homeless who have been living 
in empty locker rooms (Manfred, 2015). Further issues such as roof leaks and faulty air 
conditioning led to its closure in 2015.  
Even Brazil’s flagship stadium for the World Cup, Maracanã, has had to resort to 
creative ways of making the stadium more sustainable. Maracanã is home to three top tier and 
one second division club, nonetheless it still runs at a loss (Deutsche Welle, 2016). With only 
about 20000 thousand spectators at top tier games because tickets are simply too expensive, it 
has turned to hosting differing kinds of events (Deutsche Welle, 2016). The stadium now 
hosts corporate events such as conferences, meetings, product launches, team building and 
company holiday parties (Oderbrecht, 2015). It goes on further to cater to social events too 
such as birthday parties, marriage ceremonies, bar mitzvahs and picnics too (Oderbrecht, 
2015). This shows the lengths municipalities have to go to offset the cost of the stadia around 
Brazil which they still do not reach. 
As was seen in South Africa, there are also instances of obscure World Cups arenas 
too. The Arena Amazonia is a Brazilian example of remote white elephant stadia. Costing 
US$ 300 million, it is located in the middle of the Amazon rainforest in the city of Manaus 
that is only accessible by boat or plane (Manfried, 2015). This city also does not have a 
resident football team, and local football teams find it too costly to use. The stadium in 
Manaus was incredibly wasteful by the Brazil government, and the feeble justification of 
bringing the World Cup to the city is not good enough when the city’s inhabitants are 
struggling. To show just how unreasonable Arena Amazonia was, it holds 44,500 fans. This 
is significant as this is higher than the total number of spectators who attended league 
matches in the city for the whole of 2009, showing how underused the stadium will continue 
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to be (Pearson, 2014). Its isolation and inaccessibility also deters other events from travelling 
to the city as it is situated far away from the more populated areas of Brazil (Pearson, 2014). 
The spending on this World Cup stadium in particular could have gone a long way in build 
roads to and from the city of Manuas if the public had deemed it a priority. 
Having briefly touched on the importance of accessibility and roads this next section 
with addressed the wider supporting structures of the World Cup involving mobility. 
 
4.3.5. Transport 
Transport is a crucial aspect in hosting MSEs. It is integral to the flow and 
uninterrupted procedure of World Cups, hence why it is one of the more straightforward 
conditions governments have to guarantee. The highest level of administrative assistance 
such as telecommunications, efficient transportation as well as priority access to motorways 
and security must be provided for the World Cup and FIFA officials, ensuring the smooth 
running of the event (South Africa 2010 Bid Company 2003:Chapter 4.4).  
Both South Africa and Brazil had major infrastructural overhauls to their 
transportation network for their respective World Cups. This included upgrades in the road 
and rail infrastructure, the building of new airports as well as the provision of new bus 
systems.  
In South Africa the cost of transportation networks totalled US$ 1.7 billion (South 
African Ministry of Finance, 2010). The Ministry of Finance (2010) asserts that this was 
necessary spending and further justified as such upgrades coincided which the government’s 
plans to improve urban mobility across the country. This resulted in the purchase of 1,400 
luxury buses, construction of bus rapid transit (Rea Vaya) projects in major cities, highway 
and road upgrades and the completion of the state of the art Gautrain fast rail network (was 
not a specific World Cup project) (South African Ministry of Finance, 2010). These 
64 
 
investments are indeed beneficial for cities and their people, for the obvious reason of 
increasing the speed at which one can get from point A to point B. In a business sense this 
could mean a quicker way in which commerce could take place and may also mean the 
integration of markets that may not have been as easily accessible due to time and distance 
obstacles. 
However, these improvements did have their criticisms especially that of the 
Gautrain. Desai and Vahed (2010) repeat the numerous issues stated by the Congress of 
South African Trade Unions (COSATU) in opposition to the project. They state that the 
billions used to build the Gautrian (US$1.8 billion to be exact) serves the rich elite instead of 
improving the transport system for the poor majority. This is true as the Gautrain can cost 
users up to five times more than was advertised and is simply too expensive for those who 
really do suffer from transport problems such as South Africa’s poorest often travelling from 
places like Soweto and Diepsloot (Vavi, 2006). 
Brazil had major short comings in its transport infrastructure too. Its transport system 
was described as inefficient, outdated and unsafe with more than 50,000 people dying in 
traffic accidents in 2013 (Gaffney, 2014). Rio de Janeiro could not meet the required demand 
in terms of transport volume and quality service. Partly to blame was an inadequate subway 
network with only two routes, and no subway connection to important suburbs with particular 
significance for tourism (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2011:34). Therefore, the number of 
travellers by road increased, leading to more traffic jams. 
The World Cup provided a necessary push for the government to improve the 
transport system, as it quite clearly would not have been able to handle transporting 
thousands of football fans. Great plans were laid down to improve the passenger rail system 
linking the airports to the inner city and surrounding suburbs. Long overdue upgrades to 
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airports were implemented too with the opening of new terminals in Brasilia and Sao Paulo 
(Boadle, 2014). 
These initiatives would have a more direct impact on the developmental agenda of 
Brazil, as the transport sector was so lacking. This is one of the instances where one of the 
tangible legacies of the World Cup could have indeed been beneficial for the average citizen 
somewhat softening the US$ 6 billion blow in which Brazil spent on transport (Statista, 
2016). 
Unfortunately for Brazil, a large number of these improvements to transport 
infrastructure were either not followed through on or unfinished. Boadle (2014) reports a total 
of one fifth of projects were dropped on the basis that they would not be completed on time. 
For instance, a large amount of capital was invested in Brazil’s state of the art airports. 
Despite such investment  the country’s main airport, Sao Paulo’s International Airport of 
Guarulhos, continues to operate under occupancy rates (112% in 2014) (Cardoso, Fleury & 
Malaia, 2013:189). Another example was to be Latin America's first bullet train, a US$ 16 
billion high-speed rail service linking Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo. Unfortunately this did 
not even make it out of the conception stage (SABC, 2014). This shows a lack of planning on 
the part of the host nation and its respective LOC 
The measures implemented to try speed up the completion of the public works 
allowed for incidents of corruption under “exceptionality status” as mentioned earlier. The 
bodies responsible for carrying out these large scale projects under major time constraints 
showed little transparency in estimating budgets and costs leading to over pricing (Gaffney, 
2014). These examples illustrate a great missed opportunity by the Brazilian government to 
improve the country’s long term urban mobility shortcomings. The failure to do so served to 
further aggravate an already disgruntled populace at the subsequent bus fare hikes, 
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culminating in massive protests in 2013 to be discussed under the Social impacts section 
(SABC, 2014). 
 
4.4. Overall Cost 
Based on reports of the FIFA World Cup 2010 it is calculated that in total South 
Africa’s expenditure added up to a staggering US$ 7 billion (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 
2011:31). The investements the country had banked on to generate revenue from the event 
had minial returns, especially ticket sales and tourism did not meet their expectations. This 
led to the tournament as a whole garnering a loss of US$ 6.6 billion stated by (Konrad 
Adenauer Stiftung, 2011:31). 
Brazil went on to double South Africa’s tally, spending US$ 14 billion, and making 
the FIFA World Cup 2014 the most expensive thus far (Gaffney, 2014). The World Cup in 
Brazil cost more than South Africa 2010 and Germany 2006 combined (Gaffney, 2014). The 
overall numerical gains or losses Brazil made are yet to be published. However, from the 
economic data discussed above, one would not be entirely incorrect in assuming these figures 
will not be in Brazil’s favour in comparison to how much was spent preparing for the event. 
It must be noted that the World Cups did bring some positive change for their 
respective hosts. However, as the economic indicators and vast sums of money spent show, 
these MSEs in the two BRICS nations economically brought high costs with little or 
extremely low rewards (Baumann & Matheson, 2013:18). These countries still have socio-
economic challenges that could have been chipped away through the capital spent on the 
events, which makes them difficult to be viewed as nothing other than a loss. 
As the economic undertakings and consequences on the hosts South Africa and Brazil 
have been examined. The next section of this report which will unpack the political and social 
impacts of World Cups that are often the result of economically weighted choices. 
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Chapter Five 
Political and Social Developmental Impacts  
 
5.1. Political Impacts 
MSEs have the potential to influence the political landscape or agenda on both a local 
and global scale. The less mentioned political impacts of World Cups are often overshadowed 
by the vast sums of money or economic goals of the MSE as well as the excitement and 
euphoria surrounding the event. There is indeed a political aspect to World Cup relating to 
soft power (image portrayal) as well as consolidating political legitimacy in host countries 
too. Cornelissen (2004:1293) has rightly described the World Cup as a political commodity 
with football and politics being intertwined. This is especially true on an international level, 
from the various diplomatic measures during bidding and production made possible by 
extensive state bargaining, leveraging and negotiating, establishing political ties or loyalties.  
This chapter will begin by examining the political impacts on a global level. This 
basically entails the lengths hosts go to improve their international image and consequently 
their international standing through the concept of soft power which is deemed of great 
importance to emerging states. The report will then take a more introspective approach 
highlighting the way in which sovereignty is then cast away by the governments attempting 
to meet FIFA’s demands. The chapter will go on further in illustrating the extent to which 
FIFA challenges sovereignty by its strong arming of states to change legislation in its favour 
(Van Wyk, 2008:2). These political impacts will be explored in the lead up to the social 
impacts.  
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5.1.1. International Image 
Foreign Policy is defined as the sum total of all activities by which international 
actors, act, react and interact with the environment beyond their national borders (Vale & 
Mpaisha, 1999:89). Over recent years emerging countries have begun to improve their global 
image and foreign policy goals by means of the influence and reach of MSEs. This is the 
reason why many BRICS nations have hosted the world biggest MSEs over the past few 
years.  
One major advantage WC promoter’s use in pitching the event is that it bodes well in 
putting the host on the global map, while leading to higher levels of tourism, trade, and 
investment (Matheson, 2006:8). FIFA is of the same opinion by stating the FIFA World Cup 
is the most-watched event and helps in not only improving the image of the game, but 
improving that of the states, governments and national stakeholders too (Bid Collateral 
Brochure, 2010:1).“It is an excellent opportunity for associations to invigorate partnerships 
with sponsors, media outlets and broadcasters, as well as presenting a country to FIFA’s 
worldwide television audiences.” (Bid Collateral Brochure, 2010:2). 
However, the benefit of international exposure is intangible. Therefore, it cannot be 
represented by a measurable value making it somewhat ambiguous as to whether it is actually 
advantageous. Although intangible, the stakes for hosts remain just as high with supporters 
who visit the country and on enjoying the event either prolonging their stay or returning to 
the country in future. (SRSA, 2010:24). The same opinion is also carried in the economic 
sector as host governments believe, by hosting an incident free World Cup, the nation will be 
perceived as an attractive new market of investment, foreign headquarters or manufacturing 
base (Matheson, 2006:8).  
Black (2007:263) asserts that the underlying imperative for developing nations to 
compete to host MSEs is to “…signal developmental advances or arrival.’” In the case of 
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both South Africa and Brazil, the information presented below will emphasize the “signalling 
impulse” that is behind the respective World Cups attempting to assert the image of both 
nations as leaders in their continents. 
Marx (2004:14) encapsulates the term image as not how states are viewed at the 
present moment, but essentially how they would like to be observed after the event. For 
example, Germany in hosting the 2006 FIFA World Cup sought to change how it was 
identified by the global community. Its troubled history of war and the Nazi regime did not 
help sentiment towards Germany, worsened by Germans themselves being depicted as cold, 
unwelcoming individuals (Maennig and du Plessis, 2007:578). The slogan “Die Welt zu Gast 
bei Freunden” translating to “A time to make friends” was the image Germany wanted to and 
did achieve in showcasing the country as warm and friendly (The Telegraph, 2006). This may 
have gone a long way in improving its relations with neighbouring countries too. 
In terms of BRICS countries the image they were seeking is depicted perfectly by 
(Dowse, 2011:6) stating: 
“to project images of cosmopolitanism, modernity, efficiency and capacity to the global 
community. It was hoped that this would replace existing perceptions of underdevelopment, 
poverty, mismanagement and incapacity…” 
This is essentially why billions of dollars are spent by hosts in building new stadia, 
improving infrastructure, evicting the poor from central urban areas to outlying regions out of 
sight of those attending the World Cup. Such actions are carried out as a way for the world to 
view hosts as developed, attractive nations hopefully drawing in future foreign direct 
investment and commerce. 
The importance of image relates to the concept of soft power. Linked to the theorist 
Joseph Nye, soft power captures the way in which states use the power of attraction instead 
of the more realist dispensation of coercion or force in achieving foreign and domestic policy 
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aims and cooperation (Nye, 2008:99). Tools of soft power happen to be MSEs like FIFA 
World Cups that captivate billions at the same time marketing the specific host nation to the 
World. 
As has been stated before, the international political economy is indeed a struggle for 
power, with the more normative discourses especially from the realist and neorealist 
perspectives emphasizing the use of force in the pursuit of achieving ones goals and 
increasing its share of power (Keohane, 1989: 39). However, power politics has evolved over 
time with emerging nations competing for new power resources with the view that if a state is 
given enough effective soft power they would in turn receive voluntary cooperation from 
states (Nye, 1990: 181). This is especially the case for nations that are not powerful enough to 
coerce other states but not so weak to the point that they are overlooked entirely. South 
Africa and Brazil are to an extent vindicated by using soft power through their respective 
World Cups (Marx, 2004:6).  
The importance of soft power in South Africa was evidenced through statements 
about the World Cup: 
“The vision of the 2010 OC was achieved through the 2010 FIFA World Cup. This also led to 
a strengthening of the images of both South Africa and Africa, the promotion of new 
partnerships with other world powers and the staging of a unique and memorable event.” 
-         SRSA (2010:8) 
The Brazil World Cup was spoken of in similar undertones as former Brazilian 
President Luis Inacio Lula da Silva lobbied for the World Cup for the sake of showing the 
world how much of a superpower Brazil can be (Antunes, 2014). 
Although difficult to measure, opinions of South Africa improved in the aftermath of 
the of World Cup as the event ran relatively smoothly with supporters being satisfied with the 
hospitality and security with two-thirds of surveyed tourists stating they would visit in future 
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(South Africa.info, 2010). The same is true for Brazil as it projected its image as competitive 
and innovative in the global industry with undeniable potential. This served positively for 
Brazil’s brand and was an adequate start towards the Olympics in 2016 (Cardoso, Fleury & 
Malaia, 2013:189).  
However, in the case of South Africa there may have been a bit more pressure. Not 
only did it hold the weight of its people’s dreams and aspirations, but that of the whole of 
Africa too. Essentially, this ties into the South Africa’s foreign policy agenda of “African 
Renaissance” (Magadla, 2011). The expectations grew from local to international to regional 
as the World Cup was viewed as a tool of restoring Africa’s rightful place on the global stage 
as well as improving ties between African states (Dowse, 2011:6). This relates to the 
“goodwill” FIFA speaks of in the benefits of bidding for the World Cup as exemplified by 
South Africa inviting all African heads of state to both the opening and closing of the event. 
(Dowse, 20111:13). 
On the flipside of the coin there could be a great deal of resentment towards South 
Africa through its hosting the event. African states may have felt aggrieved that a US$ 3.1 
million loan was given to South Africa by the African Development Bank to start upgrades to 
its infrastructure ahead of 2010. Arguments could have been that there were more deserving 
or poverty stricken countries in need of such capital (Pillay, 2005). This is related to South 
Africa being viewed as a Trojan horse of the west and pursuing its own national interests, 
ostracizing in Africa (McGowan & Ahwireng-Obeng, 1998:169).The situation becomes 
problematic for South Africa when one examines the country’s significant trade, economic 
and political power in Africa, as well as its implementation of neo-liberal economic policies 
which are Western orientated. The result is that the country is further perceived as ‘the North’ 
among ‘the South’ rather than a real Southern ally (Karolia, 2012).   
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5.1.2. Domestic Image 
The internal political landscape is also affected by the hosting the World Cup. Local 
governments in both nations twist hosting such an event in their favour to increase approval 
ratings (Riegel, 2010:57). As mentioned earlier, South Africa and Brazil still struggle with 
high rates of unemployment, poverty and lack of basic services. The World Cups are then 
used as a tool in making false promises, almost appeasing the disgruntled sections of the 
population through excitement and distraction (RSA 2008:1).  
The events were used as a policy tool in showing voters that government was hearing 
their calls for more job opportunities and services, essentially winning “the hearts and minds 
of people” (Cornelissen 2004:1297). The South African ANC (African National Congress) 
led government sought to consolidate power through the World Cup, whereas in Brazil 
President Dilma Rousseff was battling re-election and needed a successful World Cup to 
improve her campaign (Watts, 2014). However, the Brazilians were not distracted by the 
spectacle of the event as the South Africans were. This was seen by the greater number of 
social movements in opposition to the event as will be discussed under the social impacts 
section. 
Furthermore, Bond (2010) highlights the opportunity of corruption taking place in the 
political sphere too. Government officials are on the receiving end of bribes, fraud and 
extortion with worst case scenarios of assassinations taking place related to the World Cup. 
In 2009 South African police were investigating the killings of several provincial politicians, 
with two or more assassinations of honest politicians who criticised World Cup 2010 
contracts in Mbombela. (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2011:58). The Brazilian government in 
2014 was caught red handed along with construction companies and businesses bribing high-
ranking officials of the state oil company Petrobras as well as politicians, in return for World 
Cup contracts (Atradius, 2015:8). These examples along with the misallocation of capital and 
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ineffective intervention by government worsen conditions for the people, fuelling a sense of 
injustice and consequent massive protest action in Brazil 2013 and continuing throughout the 
duration of the World Cup (Atradius, 2015:9). 
The lack of accountability by government can thus be linked to the legislation and 
how autonomy was handed to FIFA during World Cups as this next will examine. 
 
5.1.3. Legislation 
The state is regarded the principal actor on the international stage and being sovereign 
is critical in enabling it to act as its own autonomous entity (Baylis, Smith & Owens 
2010:119). Sovereignty, which is loosely defined as the supreme legal authority or 
unchallengeable political power a country possesses within its borders, is still regarded by 
many countries as a global covenant regardless of developmental or ideological differences 
(Heywood, 2007:458).  
However, FIFA challenges sovereignty by requiring states to comply with specific 
legal standards enclosed under government guarantees (Van Wyk, 2008:2). The magnitude 
and potential of hosting WCs has given FIFA the power to strong arm host governments into 
altering rule of law. This shifts the accountability the state previously held giving it to FIFA, 
placing FIFA’s interests above its own. Van Wyk (2008) and The National Coalition Of 
Local Committees For A People’s World Cup and Olympics (2012:7) go as far as stating that 
FIFA through their coerced government guarantees is unconstitutional and in breach of 
general laws in host countries. 
“…an external and undemocratic organisation such as FIFA was able to override the 
constitutional rights of ordinary citizens and strong-arm elected officials…into making 
concessions on taxing while demanding spending illustrates the democratic deficit...” 
(Sylvester & Harju, 2010). 
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FIFA demonstrates undemocratic tendencies by pressuring states into a highly 
unusual waiving of a fundamental right of government (Creamer, 2010). The host 
government becomes a guarantor of capital accumulation fulfilling FIFA’s and its 
commercial partner’s financial greed. FIFA has repeatedly been accused of undemocratic 
practices. Unfortunately, not much can be done when metaphorically the hosts willing agree 
to sign their souls over to FIFA (Sylvester & Harju, 2010). 
The mentioning of a democratic deficit could be viewed in 2 ways as governments 
hand over the fate of their people to FIFA during the event without much consultation on 
their part. The second being the political decision-making regarding World Cup related 
issues. These just as the economic decisions discussed earlier are dominated by one voice 
being FIFA’s (Pollock, 2010).   
The justice system was also altered in the case of South Africa 2010. FIFA demanded 
that the state set up and fund special FIFA World Cup courts. The primary objective of the 
Administration of Justice project was to fast track all criminal matters issuing from the 
2009/2010 events (SRSA, 2010:93).  This meant cases were dealt with faster, especially 
where foreigners were involved, either as complainants, witnesses or as the accused (SRSA, 
2010:93). However, significant benefits of these courts are yet to be clearly seen and 
regrettably there were also concerns of civil offences being interpreted as criminal leading to 
severe sentences for minimal transgressions (Hyde, 2010). 
General laws were further broken in Brazil as there was a ban on classes in the public 
and private school systems during the 2014, violating the right to education (The National 
Coalition of Local Committees for A People’s World Cup and Olympics, 2012:7). The 
Brazilian government went further by loosening labour conditions for citizens especially 
when Brazil was playing. Banks only had to be operational for at least 4 hours a day, other 
municipalities within Brazil granted citizens “liberal leave” which was essentially a public 
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holiday if the city was hosting a game that day (Alves, 2014). Half days were also permitted 
in cities such as Rio de Janeiro, Belo Horizonte and Recife, obviously affecting the output 
during the month of the event. 
Lastly, FIFA went as far as overruling laws that were established 13 years ago to 
protect the people of Brazil regarding fan violence. FIFA demanded the overruling of a 
previous ban of alcohol within stadia (BBC, 2012). This was nicknamed the “Budweiser Bill” 
on behalf of FIFA’s main "official beer” sponsor since 1986, Budweiser. The alcohol ban 
was instated due to the increased violence that would occur (BBC, 2012). When former FIFA 
General Secretary Jerome Valcke was questioned about the organizations decision he stated: 
“Alcoholic drinks are part of the FIFA World Cup, so we’re going to have them. Excuse me 
if I sound a bit arrogant but that’s something we won’t negotiate” (BBC, 2012). 
Such a move by FIFA raised the issue of putting its own and sponsors interests above 
the hosts and the safety of its people in the name of profit. It will be interesting to see how 
FIFA goes about working with the next hosts being Russia and especially Qatar as it is an 
Islamic state that has strict rules against the sale of alcohol (Oleaga, 2014).  
The alterations in legislation, the strict adherence to FIFA at the cost of a state’s 
autonomy and sovereignty is a revealing manifestation. It illustrates the length at which these 
hosts are willing to go to please FIFA and its sponsors. It also raises questions as to where in 
the hierarchy of needs or importance these respective governments place themselves and their 
people. The changes in legislation affect the citizens directly or indirectly from the tax 
exemption which is a lost source of government income that could be used to help in service 
delivery, the overspending on the event draining capital raised through public funds and even 
more so with the limitations of individual freedoms to the exclusions such as the ruling 
against schools, to the safety of personnel at games through the selling of alcohol on the 
grounds.  
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The National Coalition of Local Committees for a People’s World Cup and Olympics 
(2012:7) would not be incorrect for referring to the World Cup as unconstitutional. In essence 
the power is clearly in FIFA’s hands and not the hosts. This imbalance of power strongly 
leans in FIFA’s favour and results in the host’s developmental needs not being adequately 
taken into consideration.  
As the next section will show, social condtions are also impacted by the World Cup. 
 
5.2. Social Impacts 
In the lead up to the FIFA World Cup, promoters promised long lasting social benefits 
such as poverty alleviation and improved job creation. However, having examined the 
economic and political impacts the indications for World Cups being beneficial are not in 
FIFA’s favour. FIFA still stands by its stance that these MSEs are indeed positive by stating 
that these events increase civic pride and community empowerment (Bid Collateral Brochure, 
2010:3). It is further believed that World Cups help in breaking down social barriers to 
participation and high performance of previously neglected minority groups. Through the 
help of social development projects such as “Say No To Racism” and “20 centres’ for 2010” 
campaigns (Bid Collateral Brochure, 2010:3).  
These campaigns often use successful players as role models to encourage people 
whether young or old towards positive change through football by promoting healthier 
lifestyles. Therefore, this next section will illustrate that FIFA does help improve some social 
conditions in communities, but it will also illuminate the numerous social grievances 
attributed to hosting the World Cup even outweighing the positives. 
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5.2.1. Employment 
Job creation was a large selling point of both World Cups. It seemed to be a 
justification for the massive spending on construction of stadiums through the beneficial 
skills locals would inherit from being part of the composition of the events. There were 
numerous estimations of the number of jobs that would be created from the event with the 
approximations being at more than 400000 jobs for South Africa (SRSA, 2010:84). Not even 
half of that estimation was met with only 130000 jobs being created (Gibson, 2010). 
Even though the estimates from the Brazilian Federal Government from data 
conducted by the Economic Research Institute Foundation (FIPE) stated that the World Cup 
is expected to make about 1 million jobs (World Cup Portal, 2014), statistics in Brazil served 
for no better reading either as Forbes Journalist Jeff Fick (2014) reports:  
“The 2014 FIFA World Cup hasn’t turned out to be the big job boost that Brazil’s 
government thought…Although it is hard to measure precisely, the 12 cities hosting the 
ongoing soccer tournament all have fewer net jobs in the January to May period this year 
(2014) than they did in 2010.” 
Furthermore, for South Africans and Brazilians the construction jobs only provided 
temporary employment and created a false sense of national economic improvement. As 
these jobs were temporary, most of them would have disappeared after the projects were 
completed. It must be noted that these jobs do indeed benefit the poorest as there is a small 
cash injection from the construction with the hope that there is a significant transfer of skills 
to help employability in the future (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2011:58). This is a good 
example of how World Cups are dualistic in nature as they provide employment and the 
transfer of skills, but in the same breath the job is probably lost as the construction jobs are 
temporary. The resultant job losses and unconvincing employment figures from both South 
Africa and Brazil bring into question the reliability of consulting firms such as Grant 
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Thorton. Such firms may have miscalculated employment figures not factoring into account 
the phenomenon that is taking place in the real economy termed “jobless growth” which 
means that despite an increase in GDP, job creation falls (Cottle, 2010:6). 
 
5.2.2. Informal Sector and Evictions 
In keeping with employment, the informal sector was adversely affected by the 
hosting of World Cups.The concept of the informal sector is established from a study by 
Keith Hart in the 1970s, in the context of the developing world. He defined informality 
simply as “self employment” (Gerxhani, 2003:267; Bromley, 1990:335). While in earlier 
studies the informal sector was seen as a marginal activity, it is now considered a central 
aspect of economic and social dynamics, especially in emerging countries such as South 
Africa and Brazil (Gerxhani, 2003:268).  
Employment in the informal sector affects those who partake by choice, by necessity 
and by tradition outside of those that involve contractual and legally regulated employment. 
This leads to numerous instances of tax evasion, resulting in substantial errors in measuring 
the gross national product (GNP) as well as unreported income small-scale operations and 
unregistered or unlicensed activities (Chen, et al, 2005). Most importantly, in the context of 
emerging or developing nations is the social aspect of the informal sector. Citizens engage in 
the informal economy out of survival, as such individuals are unable to secure regular formal 
or wage based employment of their choice and have to turn to the informal economy that 
generates some sort of income although minimal (Gerxhani, 2003:276). 
During the World Cup, FIFA’s demands greatly infringe upon the informal sector. 
Informal traders are the most affected as they look to capitalize on the wave of incoming 
tourists willing to spend money at the event. In South Africa exclusion issues were opposed 
by StreetNet International (Union of informal traders). This coalition worked towards 
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lobbying with host cities and government to ensure their homes and livelihood would not be 
impeded (Nadvi, 2008: 43). Unfortunately, this fell on deaf ears as extra police evicted street 
traders and vendors, a community constituting a significant portion of the city’s informal 
economy, away from their customer base. The reasoning for this being, to improve the 
appearance of host cities in South Africa known as the Slum Clearance Programme (SCP), 
packaged by the governments under the guise of urban renewal (Nadvi, 2008: 43). 
FIFA (2014:3) counters these claims by stating that it “works hard to ensure that street 
traders are part of the World Cup.” They justify the two km radius of exclusion zones as a 
security measure. They then go on to state that street traders already working around the 
stadiums were registered and are therefore able to work close to the stadiums and the FIFA 
Fan Fests (FIFA, 2014:3). What FIFA does not mention is that to be registered, these traders 
have to pay FIFA for their licenses to trade which many of these informal traders cannot 
afford. Acquiring a trading permit from FIFA also entails the rent charges (paid to FIFA) 
attached to it which are very expensive (Nadvi, 2008:43). Informal traders also receive 
special training, a uniform and accreditation allowing them to sell authorised products from 
FIFA. One could argue, this brings such commerce out of the informal category into that of 
the formal. However, aquiring trading permits for some traders could be entirely out of reach 
as they could be migrants in which applying for trading licenses may not be an option as they 
do not possess the adequate paperwork.  
The violation of the rights of individuals through the exclusion and eviction of the 
poorest individuals is carried out to improve aesthetics and supposedly create public order. In 
some instances even the wealthy in host nations are affected by evictions. These are evictions 
of a different kind. For instance, wealthier classes were relocated from local hospitals as 
designated hospitals by FIFA had to keep their wards half empty throughout the tournament 
(Sunday Times, 2010). The results of this if not carried out cautiously could be fatal for long 
80 
 
term patients with chronic illness. Therefore, across the board citizens in host nations 
regardless of class are not immune to the threat of evictions in one form or another. 
Total figures of evictions in South Africa and Brazil are hard to come by due to the 
unofficial nature of the living conditions of these individuals. It is believed that thousands of 
individuals or squatters were invicted from derelict buildings in Johannesurg due to health 
and security hazards. This was worsened by the 20000 residents removed from the Joe Slovo 
informal settlement in Cape Town to impoverished areas at the city’s edge prior to the FIFA 
2010 South Africa World Cup (Tissington, 2009).  
Estimates before the Brazil 2014 World Cup were not looking promising either with 
170000 people expected to be displaced as a result of large scale projects in preparation for 
the World Cup (The National Coalition of Local Committees for a People’s World Cup and 
Olympics, 2012:8). By 2014 Amnesty International had claimed that since 2009 
approximately 30000 families in and round Rio de Janeiro had been forced out of their homes 
placing the overall tally in 2013 at 170000 people countrywide (Atkins, 2013). Such 
occurrences violate these citizens right to land under the federal constitution of Brazil 
(Atkins, 2013). The evictions are worsened by the manner in which they occur and the 
provisions of relocation to areas far away from work compared to where they had previously 
lived. Furthermore, the reparations or lump sum payment given to them often is not adequate 
in paying for their new living quarters, that is if they get reparations to begin with (Waldron, 
2014).  
The evictions had greater social repurscussions such as protests and blockades that 
will be discussed further below, however the next part of this section in relation to evictions 
will address the manner in which this took place being the repression by local authorities. 
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5.2.3. Repression 
“The poorest are only remembered when it comes to policing and repressive policies that 
further criminalize and penalize poverty.”(The National Coalition of Local Committees for a 
People’s World Cup and Olympics 2012:7). 
Security remains a matter of serious concern at World Cups. Governments dedicate a 
large sum of their budgets to beef up their security and policing forces which in some 
instances lead to repression of the citizens they are supposed to protect (Greeff, 2008:14). 
Crime and domestic insurgence were two major concerns in these specific cases of World 
Cups. The South African government made extra provisions in terms of security, resulting in 
40000 new police officers, with reservist police officers doubling to 100000 (SRSA, 
2010:174). Similar provisions were made in Brazil where 47000 more officers were 
scheduled to work and private security companies thriving too with American private security 
firm Academi – formerly known as Blackwater – training military and federal police for 2014 
(Parkin, 2014). 
In South Africa armed robberies, carjackings, burglaries and in the worst cases 
murder are the major crimes committed, raising its crime rate to one if not the highest in the 
world (The Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, 2007). In the poorest areas 
of Brazil the influence of drug gangs or armed militia groups, creates a state-free zone where 
the population is unprotected. Here there is little or no state influence on security and service 
delivery, which is especially the case in the favelas (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2011:92). A 
large contingent of crime in Rio de Janeiro can be attributed to such groups. 
Initially, the increase of police officers is positive as instances of crime decrease. 
However, if there is over compensation by the police and security forces, suppression of the 
populace occurs (Speri, 2014). This was the case in Brazil with the introduction of the special 
police peacekeeping units (‘Unidades Policiais Pacificadoras’ – UPP) or “Pacification 
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Programme”, resulting in the largest police crackdown and surveillance aimed at taking back 
control of the slums by gangs (Speri, 2014). The often violent repression was most often 
directed in the poorest areas. It was characterized by invasion of residences, searches without 
warrants, humiliating body searches, curfews, special arbitrary rules violating residents’ 
rights to come and go, freedom of expression, and assembly being denounced (Contra A 
Copa, 2014). The reseidents of affected communities living within the favelas were all treated 
as suspected criminals. Security officials’ state, that the over committed efforts are not a 
reaction to the World Cup. However, the public viewed it as such and rightly so as this is yet 
another instance where hosts attempt to please FIFA at the expense of their own people. 
Cleonice Dias, a community leader in the Cidade de Deus, which has been under 
UPP, complains:  
“Those of us who are from the community know that the UPP is linked to satisfying the 
people of Rio de Janeiro and Brazil, and showing that the State has control over the 
communities. They want to say that there will be security because we, the poor, will be 
controlled, and all the investments for the mega-events can come freely.” (The National 
Coalition of Local Committees for a People’s World Cup and Olympics, 2012:32). 
This is not to say that during MSEs crime and anarchy should be rampant, but when 
the poorest individuals already have little as is, it is unjust to repress them further, breading 
further insecurity from the demeaning acts by the police. This is made worse when the 
clashes with civilians result in deaths too. Trigger happy elite police units kill 1300 a year 
mostly poor or black (Contra A Copa, 2014). Disappearances are also commonplace such as 
Amarildo de Souza whose disappearance was blamed on the police and was a catalyst for the 
protest action that would later sweep across Brazil in the lead up to the World Cup (Waldron, 
2014). 
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5.2.4. Strike Action and Protests 
In addition to repressive police action, strike action did take place before each of the 
World Cups, but was more prevalent in Brazil. The Brazilians were more attuned to the 
grievances on the ground and not blinded by the hype of the World Cup itself. The majority 
of the strikes that took place in South Africa were carried out by aggrieved construction 
workers who got the short end of the stick in terms of wages. 
In the lead up to FIFA World Cup 2010 the most dissatisfied individuals were the 
construction workers. Cottle (2010:10) highlights the strides made by this group of people 
through the 26 strikes that occurred in South Africa. These strikes took place as a result of the 
highly unfavourable working conditions faced. The low wages, lack of adequate health and 
safety measures at project sites led to action being taken, facilitated by the National Union of 
Mine Workers (NUM) and the Building Construction and Allied Workers Union (BCAWU) 
(Cottle, 2010:25). 
This culminated in a 70000 people strong, eight day nationwide construction workers 
strike in 2009 bringing all progress to a halt (Taal, 2010). The strike did succeed in slightly 
raising the workers menial salaries by 12% to about $183 dollars a month but at the other end 
of the spectrum the heads of the most prominent construction companies earn millions 
annually and so do their firms in the billions (Taal, 2010). Looking at CEO’s total 
remuneration in the South African context, including benefits and bonuses, the average pay 
of each of these individuals, has risen by over 200% from R 2.9million in 2004 to R 8.9 
million in 2009. It will take a general worker 285 years to earn what a construction company 
chief executive earns in one year (Taal, 2010).  
In Brazil the conditions for workers were slightly better in terms of earnings as a 
survey of workers' wages commissioned by the Interunion Statistics and Social Studies 
Department (DIEESE) of the International Wood and Construction Workers' Federation 
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(ICM) revealed that construction workers at World Cup building sites earned at least USD 
$377 and at most USD $520 (De Paula, 2014:4). However, this did not please the Brazilian 
workers as shown by the 26 strikes that took place demanding the overtime pay and premium 
rates guaranteed by Brazil's labour laws. 
The protest action was also a reaction to the increasing prices of goods and services as 
a result of World Cup preparations. Initially the unrest was small as individuals were 
protesting against an increase in bus fares of about 20 centavos (at the time, nine American 
cents) in June 2013 (The Economist, 2014). This then escalated into massive violent anti-
government protests breaking out, illustrating how the World Cup uncovered the country's 
endemic poverty and social issues which had long been ignored. The dissatisfaction was on 
the basis of the lack of public services, corruption, the increasing cost of living as well as the 
lack of poverty reduction and increasing police brutality (Contra A Copa, 2014). In some 
instances the police joined the strike action as they were unhappy about their pay along with 
bus drivers (Speri, 2014). The public outrage bridged wide class differences too as the college 
educated middle class that often shied away from activism began to protest alongside those 
from the favelas with the common enemy being FIFA (Contra a Copa, 2014).  
Protest action was further aggravated in São Paulo where at least 15000 homeless 
people blocked one of the city’s main thoroughfares at rush hour, clogging already congested 
streets in the biggest single protest (The Economist, 2014). This intensified as more homeless 
people began setting up camp near the São Paulo stadium, set to hold the Cup’s opening 
game. The camp, which the families named 'The People's Cup,' impeded traffic to the games 
and served as a reminder to tourists and locals alike of the suffering of Brazil's poor 
populations.  
The protests did dwindle in the year of the World Cup as the direct violence and the 
presence of 100000 policemen and 57000 soldiers enlisted to keep the peace during the 
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football championship deterred many protesters along with the reality of legal prosecution 
(Hershaw, 2014). Givanildo Manoel, a member of the Popular Committee for the World Cup 
in São Paulo, told VICE News (2014) 
“The police repression leading up to the World Cup was simply too much for most protesters, 
the legal and direct repression of protesters had the effect of shrinking our movements. That 
is what they wanted.” 
The government of Brazil, determined to crush these movements, restructured its 
legal framework pertaining to antiterrorism statutes. This essentially outlawed protest action 
as an act of terrorism, even though Brazil has never experienced an actual terrorist attack 
(Bessi & Santiago Navarro, 2015). On August 13, the chamber of deputies approved an 
antiterrorism bill submitted by President Dilma Rousseff without any debate. Basically this 
law stated arson and sabotage of transportation or of any public property, such as computer 
systems or communications media operations, are considered acts of terrorism, punishable by 
up to thirty years in prison (Bessi & Santiago Navarro, 2015).  
Some of the actions included under the bill related to occurrences in social 
movements and protests, highlighting the difficulty of categorizing “terroristic conduct” in 
general while avoiding falling into the trap of criminalizing social protest and of the 
relativization of democratic procedures. By criminalizing the social struggle on such broad 
terms, activists raised concerns over there being no limits to its general categorization of 
terrorist acts hence infringing on the citizens rights (Bessi & Santiago Navarro, 2015). 
Essentially this left the use of the broad term terrorist acts a lot of room for individual 
interpretation. 
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5.2.5. Civic Pride, Unity and Xenophobia  
In spite of the negative connotations highlighted above the South African government 
stand by the opinion that the event did reinforce social cohesion including cultural diversity, 
national identity (South African Government News Agency, 2014). They believe it fostered a 
sense of pride and unity across racial and class divides in a country marred by deep racial 
discrimination. The South African Sports and Recreation report on FIFA World Cup 2010 
further states it left an “intangible legacy” of pride and unity among South Africans and had 
boosted the country’s image internationally (SRSA, 2013). President Jacob Zuma was stated 
as saying the billions South Africa that had spent on the World Cup had paid off with 
improvements to the country’s infrastructure as well as “priceless” social benefits (The Mail 
& Guardian, 2010).  
However, with such claimed positive benefits for social cohesion, what the South 
African government did not mention is how essentially the World Cup unravelled some of  
the social fabric within the country revealing further inequalities and injustice against the 
people at the hands of capitalists as will be shown.  
In both South Africa and Brazil as previously discussed, the poor remained poor, 
unemployment did not significantly improve and social costs and standards worsened for 
many through exclusions, evictions and suppression. Worst of all cities were left with 
expensive and oversized stadia, with the proposed aesthetic benefits not reaping any effective 
economic benefits just a loss of public expenditure. 
Immediate reflections of the impact of the World Cup on the intangible goal of nation 
building as well as image were positive in South Africa with the outpouring of flags and 
multi-racial composition of stadia audiences based on government reports (SRSA, 2013). 
This was seen as signs or steps toward the agenda of racial reconciliation and the 
development of a South African as well as African identity.  
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However, as the World Cup finals were drawing to a close the cohesive effects of the 
event had almost immediately disappeared with the spectre of xenophobic attacks on foreign 
nationals (Cottle, 2010:2). Such occurrences to an extent squandered the goodwill South 
Africa and its people fought hard to achieve in the lead up to the event. There is great 
significance linked to the xenophobia outbreak in 2010 and after the World Cup 2010. There 
are implications that the outbreak may have been misdirected frustration at the government’s 
failure to deliver basic services, job opportunities and social upliftment to the poor 
communities as was promised in the bid (Campbell, 2015). The violent xenophobia outbreaks 
which are even still prevalent in the year 2015 emphasize the magnitude of economic 
disadvantage that many South Africans continue to face (Campbell, 2015). Extensive media 
coverage of violent xenophobic attacks with disturbing images of individuals being burnt 
alive shown across numerous news platforms damaged the image of Africa emerging beyond 
poverty, hunger and violence to a more hospitable new market which the World Cup sought 
to achieve was tarnished.  
Thankfully, no similar violent occurrences were witnessed in the Brazilian context. 
This is not to say Brazilians were pleased with the effects of the World Cup either. Daibert 
(2014) states the cost of living rose and urban mobility did not improve, a large number of 
families were further impoverished after World Cup stadia and projects evictions too.  
Although there are numerous negative social conditions aggravated by the hosting of 
the World Cups in emerging countries, this is not to say that there were no positive effects.  If 
one is to examine the benefits of the actual game of Football and Sport in general there are 
indeed benefits of it and FIFA’s involvement at a grassroots level. 
“Sport has the power to change the world…it has the power to inspire. It has the power to 
unite people in a way that little else does. It speaks to youth in a language they understand. 
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Sport can create hope where once there was only despair. It is more powerful than 
government in breaking down racial barriers.” 
       -Nelson Mandela (Laureus, 2000) 
Football and sport do make strides in attempting to correct societal wrongs to help 
build a better world. From children playing a game of football in the townships of South 
Africa to the favelas of Brazil. Football can provide an avenue for individuals to learn skills 
such as discipline, teamwork, confidence and leadership. At its core football can teaches 
principles such as tolerance, cooperation and respect, imparting the value of effort and how to 
manage victory but also how to cope with defeat (Byrne & Byrne, 1993:568). The health 
benefits must also not be ignored as football or physical exercise in general reduces diseases 
and chances of obesity. 
For those who have not been granted the best opportunities in life, or come from a 
disadvantaged background, sport then provides healthy alternatives to harmful actions such as 
drug abuse or involvement in crime. This also correlates with supposed improved academic 
performance through the engagement in sport (Valente. Jr, 2014:6). Discriminated groups 
such as women, the disabled and minorities are also empowered through sport.  
For example with women, sport has aided in the concept of self-determination which 
is centered on the belief that a person or each singular living entity, reserves the right to 
control their own life; in every aspect as well as expression through the channel of sport 
(Levermore & Budd, 2006:61). This has been a challenge due to the uneven playing ground 
of gender relations throughout history have been patriarchal. 
Such social positives from sport have led to a greater involvement by FIFA and its 
sponsors in football development programmes at a grassroots level due to their social, 
educational and cultural values. This is seen through programs in relation to FIFA World 
Cups such as Football for Hope Programme: Football for Hope is a movement that uses the 
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power of the game for positive social change. The “Football for Hope Festivals” at both the 
2010 and 2014 World Cups were one of the main social initiatives held over the FWC 
tournament (Football For Hope Festival, 2014). The 20 Centres for 2010: which aimed to 
build 20 centres of education, public health and football across Africa with the help of FIFA 
sponsors Adidas, Coca Cola, Hyundai, Sony, Kia and Visa also contribute to educational and 
health based initiatives in host countries (SRSA, 2010:86). This was in conjunction with the 
numerous programmes to construct football fields across both countries helping the younger 
generation engage more with the game (Football For Hope Festival, 2014). The social and 
football development programmes do help improve the image of FIFA and its sponsors 
keeping them from being entirely catergorized as a negative influence as a whole. 
Essentially, there was only one winner. FIFA is the biggest beneficiary of World Cups 
which is no surprise. The standardized set of regulations established by its bureaucratized 
administration carried out proceedings in South Africa and Brazil effectively in maximizing 
profits. The organization earns billions of dollars through sponsorship or marketing deals, 
broadcasting rights, ticketing and merchandising commerce related to the event (FIFA, 
2014:1).  
Both South Africa and Brazil were a huge financial success for FIFA. The 2010 
installation of the World Cup was greatly profitable as FIFA closed the (2007-2010) period 
with a result of USD $631 million increasing its reserves to USD $1,28 billion by the closing 
of 2010 (Financial Report, 2010:9).  
The 2014 World Cup in Brazil was also a major success for the organization. Overall, 
FIFA recorded a positive result over the finanacial period (2011-2014) of USD $338 million 
(Financial Report, 2014:14).  Surprisingly, this was less than that in 2010 even though the 
event in Brazil cost double that of South Africa. However, the greater profit in the in 2010 
could largely be attributed to it being the first World Cup in the continent essentially making 
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it a brand new market for FIFA and its accompinments. Nevertheless, the 2014 World Cup 
left the organization with reserves at a staggering USD$ 1.5 billion as at 31 December 2014 
(Financial Report, 2014:20). 
It is then safe to say that it is inconsequential as to what the bids and aspirations of 
host nation were and how much benefit whether financial, politcal or social it hoped to gain. 
At the end of it all, it is the MNCs and predominantly FIFA that are the biggest benefactors. 
This is supported by Alegi (2001:2) stating the most valuable asset of FIFA is the Soccer 
World Cup and it will not hand-over the honour of hosting it to just any country if the 
possibility of profit and economic gain is not seen in the bidding documents. Quite frankly, 
from the examination of these two cases bidding for the World Cup seems to have become a 
contest between power seeking governments, and an equally ruthless international sporting 
organization. 
Having unpacked the developmental impacts of FIFA World Cups in South Africa as 
well as Brazil economically, politically and socially a few crucial components of this paper 
have consequently been addressed. Points such as, what the demands of hosting a FIFA 
World Cup entail as well as the lengths hosts went to produce a successful event. However, 
there is a need to contextualize some of these consequences within the framework of the 
overarching theory of Neoliberalism which this next chapter will seek to do. Giving these 
findings a theoretical grounding helps consolidate the opinion that in reality FIFA World 
Cups are not as beneficial as predicted and serve more as an obstacle to an emrging country’s 
development. This will be accompanied by existing literature that supports these claims and 
lays the ground work for the report to look towards future events, predicting whether similar 
patterns or trends could be repeated and recommendations on how to combat issues faced. 
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Chapter Six 
Summary and Application of Theory 
Numerous promises were made to prospective hosts in the lead up to the World Cup. 
Promises of not just the elation or excitement of the global showpiece, but the world wide 
exposure and highly anticipated developmental returns (Maennig, 2007). Regrettably, this 
was not to be as the cases revealed. Neoliberalist policies claiming a more prosperous 
integrated economic, political and social organization through components such as capitalism 
did not yield the mutual benefits for all (Castells, 1993). The global flows and uneven power 
relations seen in the international community were once again perpetuated through the 
relationship between FIFA and host nations. As a result, the perceived mutual benefits of 
neoliberalism and World Cups as a whole were not realized. 
To reiterate, neoliberalism is the theory of political economic practice, implying 
prosperity through liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and allowing for capital 
accumulation (Judge et al, 1995:41). An environment for growth is said to be created through 
various facilitations made by domestic policy of a host state or government. Such procedures 
are often referred to as a laissez-faire form of self-governance in which individual entities are 
responsible for their own economic and consequently social conditions (Heywood, 2007:78). 
This however removes the control of government, reducing its accountability for the welfare 
and freedom of citizens (Currie, et al, 2001). 
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6.1. Entreprenuerial Freedom 
International organizations, sports clubs, franchises and torunaments like the World 
Cup exemplify neoliberalism through cooperation necessary to make these events possible 
but also in the wider profit-oriented business interests attached to them. Unfortunately, these 
business interests came at the expense of the host (Cardoso, Fleury & Malaia, 2013:189). 
This is the case as FIFA was granted neoliberal entrepreneurial freedom for the duration of 
both World Cups.  The implementation of the tax exemption ensured the transfer of finances 
without the impediment of taxes, tariffs or duties, minimizing government participation 
(Leijten, 2010). The tax free zones during the World Cup epitomized neoliberalism and 
globalization proposed by the theorists Keohane & Nye (2003:49), ensuring the movement of 
capital and commerce unimpeded through time and space (Harvey & Houle, 1994:341).  
FIFA was allowed such freedom through the neoliberal concept of complex 
interdependence (Koehane and Nye, 1997). Complex interdependence states that entities and 
their economic success are determined through cooperation with one another that is believed 
to result in mutual benefit of all involved parties (Currie, I, et al., 2001). To a certain extent 
mutual benefit did occur as FIFA and its sponsors on the one hand were allowed to engage in 
commerce tax-free. On the other hand South Africa and Brazil as a result were granted the 
right to host the prestigious World Cup event.  
However, the mutual benefit was not entirely convincing. The tax exemption indeed 
helped FIFA and its benefactors earn greater sums of money, but this in turn led to the loss of 
large sums of capital and taxable income for both hosts as the data illustrated. This is 
significant to note because in the lead up to both World Cups, the importance of these taxes 
was one of the major selling points of the benefits of MSEs in these emerging countries 
(Pollock, 2010). 
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To put it simply, the free market approach that was afforded to FIFA through the 
government guarantees wholeheartedly coincided with neoliberalist qualities in terms of the 
practice of its policies. However, the rewards or consequences were not that of mutual benefit 
as is often stated to be the case as a result of cooperation through neoliberalism. Literature by 
sports and IR scholars Levermore and Budd (2004:8) proposes that mutual benefits are a 
consequence of having common interests and concerns with other members involved. These 
scholars do not however explicitly make mention that through mutual benefit one party, being 
FIFA, can clearly overshadow another, being the host, in the hunt for profit, to the point of 
manipulating the benefit of hosting a World Cup to be an expense for the host.  
The demands FIFA made for itself and partners essentially placed their interests and 
needs above the hosts. Neoliberalism in conjunction with the new international labour and 
world systems theories reiterates this through the relationship between the periphery, semi-
periphery and the core (Castells, 2000:70). The core in the form of sponsors, private 
companies and FIFA were the main beneficiaries of the capitalist neoliberalist policies as 
compared to hosts South Africa and Brazil not benefitting as greatly, basically being kept in 
the periphery (Graaff, 2003:39).  
From this it could be further argued that the conditions under the World Cup mirror 
how MNCs pay lower taxation rates or not even pay import tariffs, resulting in the periphery 
countries making losses (Castells, 2000:70). This is worsened by the fact that the profits are 
repatriated to the MNCs headquarters similar to FIFA’s multinational sponsors (Graaff, 
2003:42).  
These claims can be associated to one of the criticisms of neoliberalism as the 
increase of individual freedom and power to private companies and organizations leads to the 
widely promoted benefits being prone to capture by special interest groups in the form of the 
core actors (Beacom, 2009:5).  
94 
 
6.2. Self Interests 
Too much faith is placed on human nature and the abilities of entities under 
neoliberalism. Thus the theory fails to see survival and self-interest, underpining decisions 
made or action taken (Dunne, Kurki & Smith, 2013:77). The overemphasis of human ability 
and the rational character of entities lead to the theory being unable to account for players 
seeking self interests and greater returns at the expense other involved parties.  
Privately owned construction companies illustrate the anticipated benefits being 
captured by special interest groups (IELA, 2013:5). The fact that construction companies 
were caught and charged for collusion illustrates the legnth these companies will go to 
achieve their profit making goals, even if that entails breaking the law. This illustrates how in 
actuality stadia construction catered more to the neoliberal goals and aims of companies, as 
the data showed, at the expense of South African and Brazilian taxpayers (Bid Collateral 
Brochure, 2010:2).  
The fraudulent profit making practices seen by the construction companies highlights 
another criticism of neoliberalism, being that its practices may lead to and/or perpetuate 
inequality hindering long term growth (Beacom, 2009:5). Hence the reason new international 
labour theory and the world systems theory are applicable in this report. This also happens to 
be one of the times where neoliberalism actually coincides with neorealism as cooperation is 
made to be highly problematic due to the pressure of self interests (Dunne, Kurki & Smith, 
2013:70).  
One has to bear in mind that neoliberalism with its free market approach is somewhat 
facilitated by the hosts resulting in bid rigging and colluding in the name of maximising 
profit (Sarwar, Siddiqi, & Butt, 2013:80). The neoliberal autonomy given to actors during the 
World Cup enables such practices which are further made possible with the reduced 
interference of government in economic activity (Oatley, 2006:362). This point illustrates the 
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evolution of the international system in general, as similar power shifts away from 
government take place in the lead up to and during the World Cup. States which were once 
considered the most powerful entities in the international system are now being usurped by 
the influence of actors such as FIFA, leading to a loss of accountability provided by the 
government as well as autonomy for the host nation. 
 
6.3. Loss of Autonomy  
Autonomy is the ability to decide for instance who controls resources or wields 
power. Basically it includes the verdicts that governments are authorized to make, how they 
make them, and what importance they have as an institution (Judge et al, 1995:41). The 
transfer of sovereignty and control away from autonomous governments to MNCs or sporting 
organizations that are not answerable to citizens most in need could be argued is a result of 
increased cooperation and integration encompassed under neoliberalism and furthermore 
globalization (Oatley, 2006:362). In the FIFA World Cup both South Africa and Brazil 
surrendered their economic and political autonomy by implementing FIFA’s demands for 
more neoliberal market oriented domestic policies (Beacom, 2009:10).  
FIFA further went on to erode state control through the political and legislative 
changes made to both countries and their respective state bodies leaving them almost 
powerless, lacking real autonomy and decision‐making ability in any shape or form during 
the event (Van Wyk, 2008:2). The transfer of power and reduced state influence during the 
World Cup decreased both governments’ ability to help direct the economic activity but it 
also relinquished the protection of the poorer citizen’s welfare and their capabilities (Gasper, 
2007:336). Such as employment insurance, education, adequate minimum wages, health 
benefits and service delivery (Gasper, 2007:336). Therefore, the hope for multi-faceted 
development as a result was severely challenged with the large role individual agency sought 
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to play as well as the overall well-being of citizens being revoked through the reduction of 
governmental power and influence. As a result of this and as the data showed, significant and 
lasting development for people that needed it most was not established. 
The surrendering of great amounts of power by the host governments intrinsically 
leads to the analysis of the social impacts of the World Cups in conjunction with the 
overarching theory. This is so as the political action of a government losing its autonomy has 
direct social repercussions on the host as a nation and its people.   
 
6.4. Employment and Exclusions  
Although profit maximization is the main goal under neoliberalism, adequate 
conditions for non-core actors and their people are not a certainty (Giddens, 2008:61). This 
was certainly the case, with many of the challenges faced in both South Africa and Brazil still 
remained unaffected if not aggravated. 
MNCs in the international community, just as FIFA did during the World Cup, 
provided working opportunities for locals in the countries they decided to host in. At a brief 
glance this is positive, but as the social developmental impacts section revealed there were 
negative consequences. The construction companies for example in search of cheap labour 
paid workers very low wages (Kukreja, 2008:323). This was compounded by unsatisfactory 
working conditions with no development or growth for the worker as the jobs were often 
short term (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2011:58).  One could go as far as stating that the 
relationship was exploitative not only from FIFA to the host as a whole, but for the people 
too through these low wages and poor working conditions. Furethermore, the residents, who 
worked tirelessly to produce both MSEs without any major incidents were to an extent 
excluded as many of them could not attend the World Cup as tickets were too expensive or 
they were removed due to exclusion zones. 
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The arbitrary discipline or repression by the police challenged civilians’ human rights 
and only worsened through the forced removals and social exclusion (Atkins, 2013). The 
violations committed against civilians were exacerbated by the fact that these people were 
often already so deeply entrenched in poverty that they had to continue working under poor 
conditions or threats to their safety as they had no other way to survive or earn a livelihood. 
This speaks to the greater issue of social exclusion the world over as certain individuals are 
alienated or blocked from resources, rights, goods and services they produce, as well as the 
opportunities that would enable them to live autonomous lives (Nisen, 2013). Once again 
showing how sport mirrors or perpetuates inequalities and the differing interests of actors 
under the more negative consequences of neoliberalism. 
The welfare and social justice during the MSEs worsened for affected civilians. The 
changes in legislation, exclusion and forced removals crushed citizens aspirations and the 
freedom to achieve them (Sen 1987). Contrary to Sen’s capability approach, FIFA’s goals 
and aims weakened the enabling environment for the realization of people’s essential needs. 
This was further characterised by the gap between the rich and the poor increasing, 
encompassing many of the results of the social impacts of the event (Graaff, 2003:49). This 
connects to similar debates about neoliberalism and the international system in general 
demonstrating how countries from the global South do not enjoy the results in the global 
international political economy as many Northern countries (Cheru, 2002:1).  
One could tie this to the points raised by sports policy theorist Barrie Houlihan who 
commented on the somewhat exploitative nature of international sporting organizations and 
the influennce of their aligned business interest groups that have a negative impact on third 
world development (Beacom, 2009:5). Houlihan in line with the overall hypothesis of this 
report states that the involvement of business in sport as seen through FIFA in the World 
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Cups has and will continue to weaken governments’ ability to convert such opportunities into 
tangible benefits for it and its people (Beacom, 2009:5). 
 
6.5. Opportunity Cost   
Another immediate problem academics and analysts identify in terms of developing 
countries hosting MSEs which is that of opportunity cost. Scholars have continuously raised 
concern of allocating resources to a project like the World Cup. This is due to the value of the 
best alternative measure of spending such finance in other sectors would be more beneficial 
to in emerging countries socio-economic structures (Besanko, Dranove, Shanley and Schaefer 
2012:47). In simpler terms, highlighting better ways the public expenditure could have been 
spent in improving the country’s domestic circumstances. These criticisms are even more 
prevalent as both hosts are emerging countries. This is a problem for a few reasons. Emerging 
or less developed countries have more aims to check off in their developmental agenda, as 
compared to MEDCs already possessing the necessary infrastructure to host the event. 
Emerging countries have to invest more in the substructure to be prepared for the event, 
whereas in developed countries it may simply be a matter of renovations rather than building 
from scratch. This is essentially why a large sum of World Cup budgets was spent on stadia 
and infrastructure (Baumann & Matheson, 2013:18).  
The lack of foresight by governments failing to consider opportunity costs of 
investments is inexcusable, especially in countries where millions of people live in slums, 
shantytowns and favelas, meanwhile accommodating and even protecting FIFA and its 
wealthy global partners (Accountancy SA 2011). The refusal to acknowledge the wasteful 
spending by governments and the debt generated from the events in official reports and by 
FIFA is disappointing. A more honest dialogue about the absence of genuine development 
from these events and the massive amounts of public funding benefiting global private 
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companies needs to become commonplace in accounts of the impacts of World Cups. The 
magnitude of spending by hosts contributes in aggravating already dire socio economic 
conditons in the host nations. Dave Zirin sums this up succinctly in commenting about the 
impacts the World Cup in South Africa, but could also be applied to Brazil by stating:  
“This is a country where staggering wealth and poverty already stand side by side. The World 
Cup, far from helping this situation, is just putting a magnifying glass on every blemish of 
this post-apartheid nation.” (Maharaj, 2015). 
 
6.6. Soft Power  
Nevertheless, the prestige surrounding the FIFA World Cup cannot be ignored. A 
MSE of such magnitude does play a role in bringing fraternity to parts of the world even only 
for a month. For the host it can be a transformative experience further exposing a state to the 
international community (Marx, 2004:9). As mentioned under the political impacts of World 
Cups, sport is now even being used as a soft power tool to prove a state’s superiority (Marx, 
2004:9). This is seen through not only hosting World Cups but by countries taking greater 
concern in Medal count rankings during the Olympics for instance.  
 As mentioned in the data section, South Africa and Brazil do not have the ability to 
use force or economic clout to coerce or gain a more favourable postion in the international 
political economy. The use of soft power in the form of FIFA World Cups helps to improve a 
host’s image (Van Wyk, 2008:2). Neoliberalist Joseph Nye restates the importance of such 
soft power through MSEs being co-optive and not coercive (Nye, 2008:99).  
The principle of soft power can be stated to be in opposition to the normative 
discourses of the struggle for power especially from the realist and neorealist perspectives, 
which emphasize the use of force in the pursuit of achieving ones goals, aims and increasing 
its share of power in the process (Keohane, 1989: 39). Soft power illustrates the evolution of 
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power politics over time with emerging nations competing for new power resources too (Nye, 
1990:181). This is especially true for nations such as South Africa and Brazil. Consequently, 
neoliberalism is able to provide an understanding of the benefits of soft power practices and 
cooperative initiatives that states embark on because they are utility-maximizing actors 
seeking mutual gains and not the domination of one actor by another.  
However, the improvements South Africa and Brazil made to their international 
image through FIFA World Cup soft power have not had the desired developmental and 
investment returns currently. As mentioned in the overview of South Africa and Brazil both 
countries are struggling through economic downturn at present. Weak economic growth and 
large foreign deficits have negatively affected investor confidence worsened by the 
depreciation of their respective currencies the Rand and Real (Kumo, Omilola & Minsat, 
2015:3). This has resulted in both countries being viewed unfavourably in the international 
community to an extent undoing the goodwill gained from hosting the World Cup.  
Such unfavourable economic conditions are largely as a result of the erratic and 
dysfunctional nature of governance in these states, leading to significant drops in investment 
grades in both countries (Pacheco and Sambo, 2016). Statistical credit ratings organizations 
Fitch Rating Incorporated and Standard & Poor's (S&P) have given South Africa a credit 
rating one notch above “junk” status (Reuters, 2016). This has serious negative implications 
on foreign investment in the country’s economy as professional investors, such as hedge 
funds, pension funds or asset managers are prohibited (by policy) from investing in “junk” 
grade economies (Reuters, 2016). Such a firm stance is taken as economies downgraded to 
‘junk’ status are perceived to have a higher likelihood of defaulting on debts therefore the 
risk of making a loss by investors is higher. This is the case in Brazil as it was given junk 
status when it descended into its longest recession since the Great Depression (Pacheco and 
Sambo, 2016).  This has meant it is harder and more expensive for Brazil to tap into 
101 
 
international markets, credit and more importantly mutual funds from investor money (The 
Guardian, 2015). In relation to neoliberalism the cooperation between Brazil and investors is 
essentially negatively affected (Reuters, 2016). From this, it can be seen that the greater 
international investment through soft power, that the World Cups hoped to achieve had been 
lost not even five years after the event took place in Brazil’s case. One could further argue 
that this may be a trend witnessed after less economically developed countries host debt 
inducing mega sporting events. An example of this would be Greece in the aftermath of the 
Olympics 2004 as it too was downgraded to junk status (Kell, 2010). 
 
6.6. Moving Forward  
As this report examined the two most recent World Cups it would be helpful to briefly 
look toward the future and the upcoming World Cups. The next of which happens to be in the 
BRICS nation of Russia 2018. This is important so as to raise recommendations for the 
country and others to follow to ensure the same mistakes are not repeated and hosts are given 
greater freedom to achieve their goals. This could be tied into areas of further study with 
regards to this topic and could affect the resultant long term impacts, effects or consequences 
of World Cups. This could aid other countries in deciding whether or not to bid on hosting 
MSEs and what the results of this may be developmentally. 
The most important recommendation would be a need for greater synergy between the 
host and FIFA. All parties must work towards a common goal. This would hopefully reduce 
chances of unequal gains in FIFA’s favour as has been the case in this report. Future hosts 
therefore need to demand greater involvement in major decisions, ensuring results are truly 
mutual. It is indeed true that there is no World Cup without FIFA but host nations do need to 
realize that there can be no World Cup without an adequate host which they should use in 
their favour. 
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Another recommendation could be that of a more thorough and honest accounting or 
auditing analysis of the cost and benefits of the event by consulting firms (SRSA, 2010:45). 
For instance, in the lead up to the bid for the 2010 World Cup grave underestimations of the 
costs and overestimations the benefits were made by firm Grant Thorton (Saunders, 2010). 
The figures provided by the firm of the estimated original budget and how much the actual 
expenditure added up to were incorrect as Cottle (2010:4) states: 
“The total tangible costs for the South African government was supposed to be “minimal”, 
estimated at R2,3 billion in 2003. Currently the 2010 estimated cost (and this is likely to be 
much higher) for the South Africa government is R39,3 billion – an enormous 1 709 percent 
increase from the original estimate.” 
More accurate estimations need to be made before a nation takes on the challenge of 
hosting a World Cup, whether or not it is actually feasible. Unfortunately, the trend of 
miscalculations seems like it will continue in Russia 2018 as the estimated budget balloned 
from US $10 billion at the time the competition was awarded to Russia in 2010 to US $20.5 
billion in late 2012 to US $29 billion by March 2013 (Kuvshinova, 2013). Granted 
estimations do fluctuate given the instability of the global economy and markets, however 
contingency plans must be in place within the host nations budget to accommodate for any 
severe changes. 
The last recommendation is that aspiring host nation,s which consider themselves 
developing or emerging, rethink whether hosting MSEs is really within their means. From 
examining these two cases it can be seen that there are still numerous socio-economic 
challenges that need to be overcome first. A World Cup in an emerging or developing 
country has greater demands on these states with large amount of the infrastructure having to 
be build from scratch (Baumann & Matheson, 2013:13). This is not the case in developed 
countries that already possess the necessary substructure for the event to be a success. 
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Developing nations and their respective governments before engaging in MSEs 
should probably focus on delivering services on the ground first. By directly being in touch 
with the most pressing needs and issues of the citizenry, governments could then ensure that 
outside investment would be long lasting and worthwhile to the areas most in need in the 
country. Most importantly, needs such as long term job creation, infrastructure development 
that does not lead to forced removals at the same time. The provision of basic services as well 
as essential amenities that were basically not a priority during the World Cup as a result of 
the opportunity cost and large sums of money diverted away to producing the events. 
 
  
104 
 
Chapter Seven 
Conclusion 
Sport remains king on the list of most attractive media entertainment properties in 
terms of attendance and the aim of earning money, as well as the sheer masses of people 
concerned by such events. With such mass appeal, sport is able to generate large amounts of 
income and in some instances affect its overarching economy of states in the process with 
transnational corporations or international sporting bodies involved in the production and 
consumption phases of global sport. 
Although neoliberalism and globalization seem to be the most common elements of 
the sport in relation to IR, a solely economic perspective yields an oversimplified picture of 
this multifaceted phenomenon and risks neglecting other important political and social 
dynamics. Hence the reason this report possesses such a broad scope by analysing the 
economic, political and social aspects of development from World Cups.  
By examining such a global occurence by and linking it to relevant aspects in the IR 
field of study such as development, this report further strived to validate sports research in 
academia. The report served to eradicate any doubts of the formidable ties between sport and 
the discipline of IR. It has been convincing in its analysis of the developmental impacts of the 
the FIFA World Cup on respective nations South Africa and Brazil. Through this 
examination, it has been revealed that World Cups are not as beneficial as they claim to be 
esepecially for emerging nations such as these. 
Before examing the developmental impacts of these MSEs, the report surveyed the 
somewhat restricted existing literature regarding sport and International Relations. It then 
looked at the overall impacts of World Cups, not just the economic impacts that have more 
often been focused on. This was carried out so as to distinguish this study from the more 
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common sport and economics papers that have been previously addressed. This was also 
done to contextualize this paper as a whole, illustrating the more fluid and interlinking nature 
of the impacts. 
The theory of neoliberalism was then defined which outlined the environment that the 
FIFA World Cup would take place in and subsequently the international nature of the event 
facilitated through globalization. Neoliberalism in conjunction with the concept of 
globalization and its proponents such as capitalism were then discussed giving this report the 
theoretical grounding required of a study in the field of IR. This was then followed by the 
description of what the concept of development entailed and how it encapsulated not only 
economic growth but also the involvement or achievement of needs and aspirations that 
individuals valued. These needs included the avalability of lasting jobs, the provision of basic 
amenities by the government allowing for adequate living and a non-repressive socio-
economic environment, hence why it was referred to as an all-encompassing human centred 
development approach.  
Before the analysis of the developmental impacts took place, introductions or 
background on the most prevalent actors being FIFA, South Africa and Brazil were given. 
This information included a brief history of the international sporting organization and the 
two countries highlighting important periods from their past. It then described the nature of 
each of these actors and their current standing so as to ease the reader into the detailed 
analysis. 
Then the comparative case study analysis of the economic impacts of the FIFA World 
Cups in South Africa and Brazil was carried out. This section reviewed several of the more 
prevalent economic impacts being the tax exemption, infrastructure, the stadia as well as the 
overall cost of the event as a whole. From this exploration it was revealed that there were 
some benefits and improvements from the preparations of the World Cup. However, these 
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were greatly outweighed by the cost of all the improvements and how these diverted funds 
away from the citizens not leading to substantial development. The economic commitments 
South Africa and Brazil made for the events came with adverse political and social 
consequences, although the World Cup did give a rather positive image of both countries.  
Often overlooked by previous studies, the political and social impacts served well to 
solidify claims that were made especially for the feasibility of emerging countries hosting 
World Cups and how the costs are remarkably high. 
The penultimate chapter applied the theory of neoliberalism and the concept of 
globalization to the developmental impacts of FIFA World Cups. Through the use of the 
neoliberalism and globalization the behaviour of actors such as FIFA, its sponsors and host 
nations were observed and critiqued theoretically. Overall, this highlighted the impacts on 
host nations surrendering both their economic and political autonomy to FIFA and the social 
repercussions of this. Multiple links were able to be drawn between the aforementioned 
party’s actions in association to actors or occurrences in the greater international community 
in general, hence the inclusion of the new international labour as well as the world systems 
theory.  
From this and the study as a whole, it was deduced that the poor did remain poor. 
Unemployment was only affected slightly or for a short period with cities being burdened 
with expensive and oversized stadia that still remained after the event. Quite simply, all that 
glitters is not gold when it comes to emerging nations hosting the FIFA World Cups. The 
benefits that were spoken of in the build up to these events did not and will never match the 
expenditure from the hosts and their public funding. 
There is indeed a great demand to host FIFA World Cups the world over, for its 
ability to draw in the masses and give a country worldwide exposure. This puts FIFA in a 
strong position to set the terms for hosting, even if such terms are unfavourable for the hosts. 
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However, for emerging countries that have not garnered the same clout or influence of 
developed countries to lobby with FIFA to make terms more beneficial will simply continue 
to come off second best. 
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